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Violence during strikes is a major problem in South Africa.  As time progresses, details of 
violent strikes are becoming more prevalent and alarming.  Violent strikes impact the economy 
and investment.  In addition, violent strikes wreak havoc in the workplace, disrupting business, 
posing a threat to human life, employment security, and property.  This dissertation analyses 
the laws that regulate strikes.  It will be argued that the Constitution and the Labour Relations 
Act are premised on peaceful strike action. Therefore, this dissertation will consider the social, 
political and economic factors that cause strikes to become violent as well as factors such as 
casualization and non-standard employment and its link to strike violence.  This dissertation 
will also consider solutions available to deal with violent strikes which are comprised of legal 
mechanisms and how employers and employees can adapt their negotiation skills to avoid 
























1.1 Background:  
Violence in the workplace during strikes has come to represent the hallmark of strikes in South 
Africa.  According to Calitz “violence has also become endemic during strikes in South Africa, 
the most notorious example being the strike at Lonmin mine in 2012 during which 44 people 
were killed.”1  
The extent of violence during strikes is alarming and grim.  In Food and Allied 
Workers Union on behalf of Kapesi v Premier Foods Ltd t/a Blue Ribbon Salt River the workers 
conspired to assassinate a manager.2  In the same case, the workers engaged in egregious acts 
of violence such as the burning of motor vehicles and homes and the killing of witnesses.3 Data 
from the South African Institute of Race Relations reflects that “181 fatalities occurred in strike 
violence between January 1999 and October 2012.  A further 313 people were injured and over 
3058 arrests made during that time period.”4  Recent statistics from the Department of Labour 
indicate that between 2005 and 2015 there were approximately 85 strikes per year.5  In addition, 
during the same period at least 5.2 million work days were lost, and in 2015 alone, 55 percent 
of strikes did not comply with the law.6 
Violent strikes have a negative effect on the economy and investment. It was 
reported in the Mail and Guardian that, “Wildcat strikes across the mining sector have cost 
South Africa more than an estimated R10-billion in lost production. From an ever-widening 
                                                          
1 K Calitz “Violent, frequent and lengthy strikes in South Africa: Is the use of replacement labour part of the 
problem?” 2016 South African Mercantile Law Journal 436,437. 
2 Food and Allied Workers Union on behalf of Kapesi and Others v Premier Foods Ltd t/a Blue Ribbon Salt River 
(2010) 31 ILJ 1654 (LC). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Nearly 200 killed in strike action in 13 years published on the 21 January 2013 available at http://                                                                                                                                                          
irr.org.za/reports-and-publications/media-releases/Strike Violence.pdf/view, accessed on 14 March 2014.  
5Annual Industrial Action Report 2015 available at http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/documents/annual-
reports/industrial-action-report/2015/industrial-action-report-2015, accessed on 07 June 2016. 
6 Ibid 35. 
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trade deficit to lower expectations of tax revenue, a volatile rand, and risks for employment, 
there are few aspects of the economy that have been left unscathed.”7 
The right to strike is a constitutionally guaranteed right.8 To enable the right to 
strike, the Labour Relations Act9 creates a legislative framework for protected strikes.  It will 
be shown that despite legislation, strikes in South Africa are excessively violent causing harm 
to property, injury to people and in some cases, even death.   
This dissertation will analyse the causes of violent strikes, arguing that the 
social, economic and political circumstances of South Africa are significant contributing factor 
as well as systemic factors like casualization and non-standard employment.  This dissertation 
will also highlight how the use of replacement employees during a strike leads to increased 
strike violence.     
From a historical standpoint, violent strikes in South Africa are not new and can 
be attributed to the social, economic and political circumstances that prevailed at the time.  This 
dissertation considers the solutions available to address the issue of violent strikes which 
include applying for an interdict;  having a strike declared unprotected; conducting a secret 
ballot before commencing with a strike and the role of the CCMA in rendering an advisory 
arbitration award in the public interest.     
Due to the dynamic nature of strike violence, it will be argued that the solution 
is not only a legal one but rather a hybrid between the law and involvement from the relevant 
stakeholders to avoid violent strikes. It will be argued that whether a strike results in violence 
is largely dependent on the manner and form in which the employer and employees negotiate.   
1.2 Research questions: 
This paper will endeavour to examine:  
1.2.1 What legislation regulates strikes, and is such legislation adequate in achieving its 
purpose?  
1.2.2 Can strike violence be attributed to shortcomings in the law or are there further 
contributing factors?   
                                                          
7 “Midterm budget: strikes cost the economy dearly” The Mail & Guardian 25 October 2012, available at 
https://mg.co.za/article/2012-10-25-strikes-cost-economy-dearly, accessed on 13 May 2013. 
8 The Constitution Act 108 of 1996, Section 23 (2). 
9 Act 66 of 1995. 
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1.2.3 Is it possible for strike violence to be prevented, and if so, what means can be used to 
curtail strike violence?  
1.2.4 How can labour dispute resolution mechanisms and the parties involved affect the way 
in which a strike plays out? 
1.3 Objectives: 
This paper aims to:  
1.3.1   Determine whether strike violence in South Africa is a new phenomenon.   
1.3.2 Identify the law that regulates the right to strike in South Africa and whether this legal 
framework is adequate in its purpose. 
1.3.3 Determine whether the violence that occurs during a strike can be attributed to the 
social, political and economic circumstances of South African.  
1.3.4 Identify the legal remedies available to employers affected by strike violence. 
1.4 Research Methodology: 
The desktop-based method of research will be used in this paper. This entails the use of and 
reference to textbooks, journal articles, statutes, and law reports.  This paper endeavours to cite 
sources accurately and will also refer to newspaper articles and reliable internet resources.   
1.5 Significance of the study:  
Violent strikes have become alarmingly prevalent in recent years.  Violence in the workplace 
poses a risk to human life, property, job security, and to the economy, such as loss of 
production, loss of permanent employment and investment in the country.10  It is, therefore, 
significant to analyse why strikes escalate to violence and the impact it has on the economy.   
It is also significant for employers, employees and their representatives to understand the laws 
that regulate strikes to ensure peaceful industrial action. 
The impact of this dissertation is to shift thinking about the causes of strike 
violence, arguing that factors such as bargaining power, inequality, casualization and non-
standard forms of employment have an influence in determining the way in which a strike takes 
place.   
                                                          
10G Murwirapachena and K Sibanda “Exploring the incidents of strikes in post-apartheid South Africa.” (2014) 
13 International Business and Economics Journal 553 at 556. 
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1.6 Structure of the dissertation:  
Chapter one introduces the topic and provides a background of violent strikes in South Africa.  
 
Chapter two provides a historical overview of violent strikes, as well as laws 
implemented to regulate strikes.   
 
Chapter three sets out the legal framework regulating strikes in the workplace.  
The LRA, the Constitution and the Code of Good Practice that regulate strikes are discussed.   
 
Chapter four looks at the causes of violent strikes. The political, social and 
economic factors as well as the link between casualization, non-standard employment and the 
use of replacement employees that prevails in South Africa and how these relate to strike 
violence are discussed.   
 
Chapter five considers the mechanisms in place to deal with strike violence as 
well as addressing alternative means of resolving disputes that may lead to violent strikes.   
 
Chapter six will conclude the dissertation and provide recommendations where 
necessary. 
 
1.7 Conclusion:  
Strike violence has reached endemic proportions in South Africa, this has a ripple effect on the 
economy, employment security and investment.  It is therefore necessary to analyse the causes 
of why strikes become violent and what can be done to prevent such violence.  This dissertation 
will analyse the legislative framework that regulates the right to strike and whether such 
legislation is adequate in achieving its purpose.  It will be demonstrated through desktop 
research methodology that legislation is adequate in regulating strikes however the legislation 
is not always adhered to which results in violent strikes.  Further that political, social and 
economic factors result in strikes becoming violent. The recent amendments pertaining to the 
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secret ballot requirement and advisory arbitration in the public interest will also be discussed.  
This dissertation will argue that an integrative approach is required between the law on one 
































THE HISTORY OF VIOLENT STRIKES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction and background 
The earliest recorded strike took place in ancient Rome in 311BC where flute players refused 
to work because they were not allowed to consume meals in the Temple of Jupiter.11 The 
Roman flute players stopped working until their demands were satisfied. 
The United Kingdom during the 19th century was home to industrial growth 
which is known today as the “industrial revolution”. 12 “As the 19th century progressed, the 
strike became more central to working-class activism.”13  During this period, strikes were 
known to achieve political aims.14 Strikes were defined as “being a form of social activism, 
strikes became the dominant form of social conflict in developed industrial society.”15 Strikes 
in the United Kingdom, arose as a result of high prices, industrial depression, unemployment 
and social ills such as tuberculosis.16  These strikes unfortunately were not well documented,   
proper record keeping only started after 1888.17  It is therefore difficult to say with accuracy 
what the causes of strikes were, rather, “strikes apparently change and fulfil diverse functions 
and respond to different problems and stimuli over different stages of industrial 
development.”18 
 This chapter focuses on major violent strikes that occurred in South African 
history arguing that strikes arose due to the social, political and economic circumstances of the 
time.  Legislation that was promulgated to deal with violent strikes is also discussed 
demonstrating that despite the legislative framework, strikes continue to be violent.  Through 
the changing course of history in South Africa, the political landscape transformed resulting in 
a constitutional democracy with a comprehensive labour law framework that aims to regulate 
strikes.  Despite the panoply of legislative measures violent strikes continue relentlessly.   
                                                          
11 R Reid “Strikes” (1910) 30 Canadian Law Times 749. 
12 E Cronin “The Peculiar Pattern of British Strikes since 1888” (1979) 18(2) Journal of British Studies 118 at 
page 122. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid 123. 
16 Ibid 126. 
17 Ibid 123. 
18 Ibid 130. 
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2.2 Overview of violent strikes in South Africa: 
Due to the discovery of precious minerals in the interior of South Africa in the late 1800’s, 
industrialisation grew.19  It became necessary to supply the growing industry with cheap labour.  
This led to black men migrating to the interior of South Africa in search of work.  In the mines, 
there was a need for skilled workers which resulted in white workers immigrating to South 
Africa from the United Kingdom and Australia.20  With the arrival of white workers, the 
workplace changed.  The division between the skilled white worker and the unskilled black 
worker led to friction.  Like the experiences of the United Kingdom during the 19th century, 
the issue of race in South Africa was a social and political issue that caused strikes.   
In the late 1800’s industry in South Africa grew, especially in the mines.  The 
discovery of diamonds in 1867 as well as the discovery of gold in 1886,21 created a demand 
for skilled labour.  Since many white workers had the necessary skills, they enjoyed a sense of 
superiority in the workplace and sought to preserve their status.22  In the early stages of 
industrialisation, this factor served as an impetus for conflict between black and white workers.  
“Therefore, the first two decades of the 20th century South African labour history were 
characterised by endemic labour unrest and industrial strike action.”23 Which, in this particular 
context was attributed to “race forming the underlying base of this militant strike period.”24  
Bendix argues that the socio-political system is a reflection of the industrial relations system.25     
South Africa has a long history of strike violence.26  Workers realised that 
striking was a means to exercise their rights and to obtain better conditions of employment. 
Below is a discussion of some of the various strikes that are recorded in South African history. 
In 1907, the economic circumstances in the Transvaal27 led to an economic 
recession.  This, accompanied by an abundance of Chinese labourers, triggered violent strikes.  
Employers hired cheaper paid black workers which aggravated the unemployed white populace 
and resulted in violent strikes.  The striking employees’ encountered resistance from the 
                                                          
19 S Van Velden & W Visser “Strikes in the Netherlands and South Africa 1900 – 1998 a comparison” (2006) 
30(1) South African Journal of Labour Relations 51 at 52. 
20 Ibid 52. 
21 Ibid 52. 
22 Ibid 52. 
23 Ibid, 52. 
24 Ibid 52. 
25 S Bendix Industrial Relations in the new South Africa 3 ed (1996) 75. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Now known as Gauteng. 
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government and employers which resulted in nine people dying and hundreds more being 
injured.28  
Due to the poor treatment of mineworkers, a strike erupted in 1913.  This strike 
spread to sympathisers in the mining and railway sectors.  The strike was excessively violent 
resulting in numerous arrests, prosecutions and the deportation of strike organisers to the 
United Kingdom and Australia.  The reason cited for the dissatisfaction amongst employees 
was job fragmentation where employees job descriptions changed to accommodate the 
employment of cheaper paid black employees.29  In practical terms, an employee’s job 
description was altered to reduce his expense to the employer which made it possible to employ 
cheaper paid black employees.   
In 1920, the price of gold decreased.  The “status quo agreement” of 1918 
stipulated that for every seventeenth black worker there would be at least two white workers 
employed.  In addition, during this period white workers earned more than their black 
counterparts.30 Mine owners sought to economise and considered the retrenchment of white 
workers, the scrapping of the “status quo agreement” and a reduction of pay for white 
workers.31  Aggrieved by these changes, in January 1922, approximately 25000 white workers 
on the Rand embarked on a violent strike.  In response, the government used force to end the 
strike.  This became known as the “Rand Rebellion” where “153 workers were killed, 500 
wounded, 5000 arrested and four strike leaders were hanged for treason.”32  
“In the latter part of 1918 and early 1919 black mineworkers embarked on a 
strike for higher pay and the abolition of the colour bar.”33 
According to Joseph, South Africa at “the beginning of the 1900s experienced 
an endemic of impetuous strike action as a result of dissatisfaction in working conditions.”34  
Employees used strikes as a means to challenge managerial prerogative and control, and as a 
tool to advance their interests against the power of employers. Due to the increase in violent 
strikes the need to regulate such action became necessary as such conduct impacted on the 
                                                          
28 Bendix (note 25;77). 
29 Ibid. 
30 S Van Velden & W Visser (note 19;55). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Bendix (note 25;79). 
33 Mpfari Budeli “Worker’s Right to Freedom of Association and Trade Unionism in South Africa: An 
Historical Perspective” 2009 Fundamina 15-2. 
34 Judell-Lesha Joseph “The Effectiveness of South African Labour Legislation in dealing with Mass Industrial 
Action before and after the Promulgation of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996” (unpublished LLM dissertation, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal 2016 at page 12). 
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business of employers as well as the stability of government.  Violent strikes persisted in the 
decades following the 1922 “Rand Rebellion” most notably “in 1946, labour protest spread to 
the gold mines with a week-long strike by more than 70 000 African miners, which was 
ruthlessly supressed by the police.”35 
During the 1950’s “Apartheid policies were opposed by township residents 
through massive stay-aways from work and boycotts of municipal services.”36  The Apartheid 
system was devised by the National Party after their election victory in 1948.  “Apartheid called 
for the separate development of different racial groups in South Africa.”37  From 1955 “Black 
labour played a more prominent role in the mounting protest, and there was a wave of strikes 
by commercial, industrial and service workers on the Rand and in other urban centres.38 
The 1970’s saw an “outburst of strikes by Black industrial workers during 1973-
1974, and a huge increase in the level and extent of Black labour unrest during the 1980’s.”39  
Violence continued into the new democracy after 1994.  The development of strike violence 
post-democracy will be detailed under 2.4 below.  One of the most notable strikes in South 
African post-democracy was the strike at the Lonmin platinum mine in 2012.  Buitendag and 
Coetzer are of the view that the strike at Marikana “is perhaps only the newest instalment in a 
century long cycle of industrial action”40 in South Africa’s history.  It must be accepted 
therefore that violence in the labour relations context has occurred throughout South Africa’s 
labour history.   
2.3 Early legislation that regulated strikes: 
According to Myeza41 the 1922 rebellion: 
 
…demonstrated the power of unregulated strikes and resulted in the government passing the 
Industrial Conciliation Act which imposed limitations on the right to strike by making a strike 
                                                          
35 M Beittel “Labour unrest in South Africa, 1870-1990” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) (1995) 18 (1) 87-
104, 89. 
36 Ibid.   
37 “A history of Apartheid in South Africa.” Available at https://www.sahistory.org.za /article/history-of-
apartheid-south-africa accessed on the 31 May 2020. 
38 M Beittel (note 34;90).   
39 Ibid.   
40 N Buitendag & N Coetzer “History as a system of wrongs – examining South Africa’s Marikana tragedy in a 
temporal legal context.” Strategic Review of Southern Africa (2015) 37 (2) 94-117, 94.   
41 S.P Myeza ‘The Extent of the Right to Strike in South African Labour Law.’ Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University available at: http://dspace.nmmu.ac.za accessed on 18 March 2020. 
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illegal unless the statutory requirements of attempting to settle the dispute in either the industrial 
council or conciliation board were adhered to. 
 
The Industrial Conciliation Act42 (hereafter ICA) was promulgated with the aim 
of regulating collective bargaining and providing recourse to statutorily enforceable mediation 
and arbitration.  According to Lewis43 “the Industrial Conciliation Act was specifically 
designed to restrict the militant defensive strategies adopted by South African trade unions in 
the years before 1922.” The ICA can be regarded as the first legislation that implemented 
provisions that prevented strikes.  The ICA prevented strikes by firstly not including a provision 
relating to a strike ballot44 this meant that unions could not undertake a ballot and therefore it 
would be unlawful to go on strike as a ballot was a requirement to go on a lawful strike. “The 
government made sure that no strikes could take place.”45  Secondly, municipal workers were 
also prohibited from striking46 and thirdly conciliation boards were established to mediate 
between employers and employees thus further minimising the possibility of strikes.47   
However, in as much as the ICA is regarded as an attempt to consolidate industrial relations 
principles, it excluded black employees from its ambit. It may be argued that the divisions 
based on race presented themselves in the labour relations context well before the advent of 
Apartheid in 1948.  Bendix points out that this resulted in a “dual set of labour relations which 
favoured white workers.”48  The implementation of the ICA was based on the principle of 
voluntariness which meant that parties who did not wish to belong to the dispute resolution 
mechanisms of the ICA did not have to.   
During the time of the Rand Rebellion, the government promulgated the Wage 
Act,49 the main purpose of which was to normalise pay for employees regardless of race.  It is 
argued that this was a progressive step towards alleviating the inequalities that plagued the 
industrial sector.  However, the Wage Act of 1925 was a failure because certain jobs were 
reserved for white employees only.  It appeared good in theory, that employees would earn 
                                                          
42 Act 11 of 1924. 
43 J Lewis “Industrialisation and Trade Union Organisation in South Africa, 1924-55: The Rise and Fall of the 
South African Trades and Labour Council.” 1984. African Studies Series. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0 
521 26312 3 (hardcovers). ISBN 0 521 3175 8 paperback (South Africa) only. 
44 C Jordaan & W Upkere “The South African Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and current Affirmative 
Action: an analysis of Labour economic history” African Journal of Business Management (2011) 5 (4) 1093-
1101 at page 1094. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid.   
47 Ibid.   
48 Bendix (note 25;81). 
49 Act 27 of 1925. 
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equally regardless of race, but in practice job reservation excluded black employees 
completely.  It can also be argued that this may have been a measure to create a false sense of 
equality so that racial domination could be perpetuated.50  By 1926 the Mines and Work 
Regulation Amendment Act51 was implemented to entrench racial divisions in the workplace 
through job reservation. 
The ICA of 1924 remained largely unchanged until it was amended and became 
known as the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 (hereafter referred to as the LRA of 1956).  A 
notable amendment to the LRA of 1956 was that it made provision for a compulsory secret 
ballot before workers could engage in a strike.52  A secret ballot means that “all members of 
the union who are eligible to vote must vote either in favour of or against a proposed strike”53.  
In addition, “black employees were completely excluded from collective bargaining under the 
LRA of 1956 and therefore could not strike.”54  The LRA of 1956, like its predecessor regarded 
strikes as a “breach of contract which allowed employers to repudiate the employment contract 
leaving striking employees without protection against unfair dismissal.”55  Since the strike 
ballot was legislated under the LRA of 1956, if there was a failure to hold a ballot the 
consequence would be that the employees would not be able to go on strike and if they did the 
employer could dismiss them for breach of contract.   
 
2.4 The development of strike violence in South Africa:  
The labour and political uprisings in the 1970’s urged the National Party government to rethink 
its policy on labour law.  The LRA of 1956 completely excluded black employees from its 
ambit.56  The Wiehahn Commission was established to evaluate labour policies and to make 
recommendations to the government.  The Wiehahn Commission recognised that there were 
certain prerequisites to ensure a peaceful industrial relations system.  This entailed that 
employees could join trade unions with regulation by the relevant authorities.  The Commission 
recommended that employees be permitted to participate in collective bargaining with the 
                                                          
50 Bendix (note 25;81). 
51 Act 25 of 1926. 
52 Section 65 (2) (b).  
53 M Tenza “An investigation into the causes of violent strikes in South Africa: Some lessons from foreign law 
and possible solutions” (2015) 19 Law, Democracy and Development Volume 211 at 214. 
54 J Myburgh “100 Years of Strike Law” (2004) 25 Industrial Law Journal 962, 964. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid.   
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employer.  Importantly, the Commission recognised that workers could legitimately go on 
strike.57   
The Wiehahn Commission made numerous recommendations for the change of 
the labour relations system in South Africa.58  The commission recommended that the 
recognition of non-white employees’ rights that could be made justiciable by a dedicated 
Industrial Court.  This served as the impetus to intensify change in the socio-political context.  
Employees recognised the benefits attained using protest in the labour relations context and 
they utilised the same approach in challenging the inadequacies of social inequality.   
Although the Wiehahn commission of enquiry was revolutionary, it did not 
mark the end of industrial unrest in South Africa.  After the Wiehahn commission of enquiry 
and during the 1980’s, trade unions in South Africa grew.  The reason for the growth of trade 
unions can be attributed to the political system that prevailed at the time.  According to 
Myburgh, “the creation of black trade unions in South Africa in the 1980’s coincided with a 
decade of political turmoil.”59 
During the 1980’s trade unions took on the role of fighting for social justice and 
political aspirations such as the end of Apartheid.  “The growth in size and proportion of the 
trade union movement in South Africa over a relatively short period of time has been 
spectacular.  It has resulted in changes to employment practices and the belief that unionism 
and wider political trends are indivisible.”60 
In 1985 the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was formed.  
COSATU, a labour federation, used the mass mobilisation of workers to protest against 
Apartheid.61  The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), South African Clothing and Textile 
Workers Union (SACTWU) and National Union of Metalworkers South Africa (NUMSA) 
were amongst the biggest unions in South Africa that supported COSATU in mass action 
against the government and employers.62 
COSATU and its affiliates organised the largest strike in South African history 
in 1987 and 1988.  In 1988 a three-day national strike was organised which involved three 
                                                          
57 N Wiehahn The Complete Wiehahn Report Johannesburg, Lex Patria, 1982 xi. 
58 Myburgh (note53;964). 
59 Myburgh (note 53;965). 
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million employees and was the largest ever of its kind.63  These strikes became violent and in 
response, employers and the government made a concerted effort to contain union activity.64 
The government made changes to the Labour Relations Act of the time65 which 
made it difficult for trade unions to embark on strike action.  The government played a 
repressive role which caused more protest and labour militancy.66  In South Africa, trade unions 
were a powerful force to abolish Apartheid.67 
In the years that followed, due to the increase of strikes, the Labour Relations 
Act was again amended68 to restore the Labour Relations Act to its pre-1988 version.  The 
Amended Act69 was a product of negotiations between the state, South African Employers 
Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs (SACCOLA), COSATU and National Council of 
Trade Unions (NACTU).  “This set a pattern of labour laws being the outcome of negotiations 
between the main parties.”70  Trade unions provided the impetus for the change of legislation 
through strikes.  In the years that followed, there were no new changes to the labour laws.  
Between 1990 and 1994 there was significant political change in South Africa with the 
unbanning of political organisations “culminating in the elections for a new democratic 
government established in April 1994.”71   
Seven months after the new government took control of South Africa, “a 
Ministerial Legal Task Team was appointed on 9 August 1994 to draft a new Labour Relations 
Act,”72 which was promulgated on the 12th December 1994.73  The new Labour Relations Act,74 
with regard to the law on strikes, will be discussed in detail in chapter 3.  
 Rycroft, commenting on the LRA posited that the “main thrust of the Act is to 
deal with what is now seen as an unacceptably high incidence of unprocedural and unnecessary 
strikes.”75  However, since its inception it did little to curtail the level of violence during strikes.  
Recent history depicts that strikes are more common and violent than ever before.   
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In 2006 a strike in the security industry became violent.  Fifty people were 
killed, and property damages cost approximately R1.5 million.76  In 2012, at the Lonmin 
platinum mines in Marikana, thirty-six people were killed and the strike damage to property 
was excessive.77 
The main reasons for the strike at Marikana were union rivalry and the demand 
for higher wages.  The extent of the strike at Marikana led to a commission of enquiry being 
established to probe the reasons for the violence at Marikana and to make recommendations to 
prevent future violence.78 The recommendations made by the Marikana Commission of 
enquiry are detailed in Chapter 5.   
In 2012 truck drivers went on strike for higher wages.79 This strike attracted a 
lot of media coverage, highlighting damage to property and harm to workers.  During 2012, in 
De Doorns, Western Cape, farm workers embarked on a violent strike.  The reason for the 
strike related to higher wages.  Property worth millions was destroyed by the strikers.80 
2.4.1 Incidences of strike violence reported in the South African law reports.  
The incidence of strike violence has not declined in recent years.  The law reports are laden 
with cases of violent strikes.  In Verulam Sawmills (Pty) Ltd v AMCU81 employees were 
reported to be carrying weapons, stopping vehicles, removing passengers from public transport 
as well as blocking entrances to and from the employer’s premises.  The employees in this case 
also damaged vehicles and caused the workplace to close during the strike.82 
The court was required to determine whether a punitive cost order should be 
awarded against the trade union for not complying with the picketing rules that were agreed 
upon with the employer before the strike could take place (please see Chapter 3 below for a 
discussion on picketing rules).  The evidence presented to the court indicated that the trade 
union organiser of the strike did not take all reasonable steps envisaged in the Labour Court 
order83 to ensure that the employees did not commit acts of violence, damage to property and 
the blocking of roads.   
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The court adopted the principle of the Tsogo Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd t/a Monte 
Casino v Future of South African Workers Union84 case which determined that unions can be 
held liable for the violent conduct of their members during a strike by stating:  
This court must necessarily express its displeasure in the strongest possible terms against the 
misconduct that the individual respondents do not deny having committed, and against unions 
that refuse or fail to take all reasonable steps to prevent its occurrence.85  
In Verulam Sawmills punitive costs were awarded against the trade union for 
being “vexatious and unreasonable.”86  The judge commented that violent strikes constitute 
“economic duress”87 which gives employees an unfair advantage during collective bargaining.  
It is also apparent from this judgment that unions and their members will be held liable for not 
taking reasonable steps to ensure that violence does not occur, and picketing agreements are 
complied with.   
In Gri-Wind Steel SA v AMCU88 the court noted the “alarming levels of 
violence.”89  Workers blocked intersections, burnt tyres on the road and committed assault.  In 
this case the employer brought an application to hold the trade union and its members in 
contempt of court for not adhering to a Labour Court order that prevented violence.  The court 
set out the legal principles for holding parties in contempt of court which entails that “proof of 
contempt of a court order requires, in particular, proof of the order, of due service on the 
relevant party, and of deliberate wilful disobedience.  Moreover, there must be proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”90   
In the Gri-Wind Steel case the court was not persuaded that the union or its 
members wilfully disobeyed the court order which resulted in the application being dismissed.  
This was because the Labour Court order did not specify precisely what steps the union ought 
to take to prevent employees from undertaking unlawful activity.  Steenkamp J noted that the 
notice of motion drafted by the employer’s representatives was not adequate in specifying what 
the union should do to prevent violence, the Labour Court order did not impose obligations on 
the union.91  The court however made clear its disdain for strike violence.   
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An analysis of case law indicates that the courts have a low level of tolerance to 
strike violence.  In KPMM Road and Earthworks (Pty) Ltd v Association of Mineworkers & 
Construction Union92 the employees went on a strike that became violent resulting in threats 
of harm, injury to property and the blocking of roads.  During the violent strike, the employer 
applied to the Labour Court for an interdict to restrain the striking employees from acts of 
violence and for the trade union to prevent its members from committing any further violence 
or damage to property. 
The Labour Court granted an order restraining striking workers from 
committing acts of violence and damage to property as well as requiring the trade union to take 
reasonable steps to persuade striking employees from committing acts of violence.  This court 
order did not stop the striking employees from committing acts of violence and damage to 
property.  
When the strike came to an end the employer applied to the Labour Court to 
hold the trade union and employees in contempt of court for not adhering to the interdict.  The 
court used the doctrine of common purpose to conclude that the employees, by virtue of being 
on strike were complicit in the acts of violence.93  In addition, the court also found that the 
trade union did not take all reasonable steps to persuade its members from engaging in acts of 
violence.94   
 The court condemned violence stating that “this kind of behaviour deserves no 
constitutional protection and should be completely rooted out of the employment 
environment.”95  The court expressed its dissatisfaction at the commonality of violent strikes 
by stating: “This court is inundated with applications by employers seeking to interdict and 
stop unlawful conduct, violence and intimidation in the course of protected strike action.”96 
In conclusion the court found that the trade union and employees were guilty of 
contempt of court.  The trade union received a fine of R1000 000.00 suspended for three years 
provided that the union was not found guilty of being in contempt of court.  The employees 
were fined R1000.00 each which was deductible from their salaries. 
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Dissatisfied by the outcome of the Labour Court, the union appealed to the 
Labour Appeal Court in Association of Mineworkers & Construction Union v KPMM Road & 
Earthworks (Pty) Ltd97.  The Labour Appeal Court first addressed the issue of whether the 
employees and the trade union were in contempt of court.  
Counsel for the employer conceded that there was no legal or factual basis for 
the employees to be guilty of contempt of court.98  The only issue before the court was whether 
the trade union was guilty of contempt for breaching the Labour Court order.  The court 
evaluated this question by following the principle in the Fakie NO v CCII Systems judgment,99 
specifically whether the trade union was wilfully or in bad faith, defiant of the Labour Court 
order.   
Upon analysing the Labour Court order Davis JA established that the Labour 
Court order was too vague.  According to the Labour Appeal Court the words in the Labour 
Court order was open to different interpretations.100  The court could not conclude that the trade 
union wilfully and in bad faith defied the court order.   
Although the union was absolved of liability in respect of being in contempt of 
court, Davis JA emphasised the importance of drafting correct notice of motion documents to 
be lodged with the court when applying for an interdict to restrain striking employees from 
engaging in unlawful acts.101 
Violence exhibited by striking workers has reached a point where workers 
blatantly disregard the rule of law. This was evident in Pik-it-up Johannesburg (Pty) Ltd v 
South African Municipal Workers Union102 where workers trashed the streets by overturning 
bins and placing trees and debris on the road.  The workers went so far as to try and intimidate 
the presiding judge which resulted in the court having to clear the gallery of striking workers.103   
Employers continue to suffer economic losses due to violent strikes.  In National 
Union of Mineworkers obo Shayi v Sishen Iron Ore Company (Pty) Ltd,104 the employees 
brought an unfair dismissal application to the Labour Court.  The employees later conceded 
during the Labour Court trial that the strike was unprotected.  Evidence led by the employer’s 
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witnesses relating to the violence and economic losses sustained during the unprotected strike 
was not challenged.  The fact that the employees ignored the Labour Court interdicts was also 
unchallenged.  The violence during the strike comprised of workers using heavy earth moving 
machinery to knock down fences.105  It was unchallenged evidence before the court that the 
employer lost approximately US $ 14 000 000 per day due to strike violence.106 The law reports 
indicate that workers armed with weapons such as knobkerries, sjamboks and sticks is the 
norm.  Assault, intimidation and vandalism are also commonly practiced during violent 
strikes.107 
The frequency of violent strikes has led the courts to become more dynamic in 
their approach to dealing with strike violence.  To deal with the regularity of violent strikes the 
judiciary is moving towards declaring protected strikes unprotected because of the level of 
violence during the strike.  Declaring protected strikes unprotected will be discussed in detail 
in chapter 5.   
The issue of union liability for strike violence was decided in the matter of South 
African Transport & Allied Workers Union & Another v Garvas 108(hereafter referred to as 
the SATAWU constitutional court decision).  In this case members of the union SATAWU 
embarked on a protected strike which complied with the procedures of the LRA (see chapter 3 
below for a discussion of the procedural requirements to embark on a strike).  It is important 
to note that this matter was decided in the context of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 
1993 (hereafter referred to as the RGA).  During the strike the members of SATAWU became 
violent and as a result widespread damage occurred to businesses in the vicinity of the gathering 
including the looting of street vendors, damage to property, motor vehicles and the death of 
fifty people.  Before organising the gathering SATAWU complied with the procedural 
requirements of the RGA, however, violence ensued.  Members of the public who suffered 
damages as a result of the violent gathering united and instituted a claim of damages against 
SATAWU, firstly under the RGA and alternatively under the common law. 
The RGA was specifically promulgated to regulate public gatherings and is 
premised on the notion of the right to gather, assemble and demonstrate. According to  the 
RGA “every person has the right to assemble with other persons and to express his views on 
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any matter freely in public and to enjoy protection of the State while doing so.”109 The RGA 
states unequivocally that the right to gather, assemble and demonstrate shall be done 
“peacefully and with due regard to the rights of others.”110   
If a gathering result in “riot damage” any person or organization maybe found 
liable. The RGA defines riot damage as: “any loss suffered as a result of any injury to or the 
death of any person, or any damage to or destruction of any property, caused directly or 
indirectly by, immediately before, during or after, the holding of a gathering.”111 follow.  
The Constitutional Court was tasked with determining firstly: “what section 11 
(2) means.  In other words, does it create a real defence that meets the constitutional 
requirement of rationality?”112 secondly, whether the defence provided for in section 11 (2) 
limits the right to freedom of assembly which is guaranteed in section 17113 of the Constitution 
and if so whether this was a justifiable limitation.114 The union on the other hand persistently 
maintained that section 11 (2) of the RGA should be declared inconsistent with section 17 of 
the Constitution and that the defence created in terms of the RGA was an insurmountable 
defence and would have a “chilling effect”115 on section 17. 
The Constitutional Court found that section 11 (2) (a), (b) and (c) are 
interrelated116 and must be read together which creates a composite defence against “riot 
damage” that is capable of being proven and not “illusory”117 as the trade union proposed.  
Furthermore, that section 11 (2) (b) does not interfere with section 17 of the Constitution.  The 
crux of the Constitutional Court decision was that the trade union ought to have reasonably 
foreseen the possibility of damage and did nothing to prevent it which resulted in SATAWU 
being held liable for riot damages.  The SATAWU Constitutional Court decision makes it 
possible for trade unions to be held liable for damages caused during a strike under the auspices 
of the RGA.  This includes claims brought by third parties.   
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In the matter of Mahlangu v South African Transport and Allied Workers Union, 
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa118 the plaintiff, Ms Mahlangu instituted action against 
the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (hereafter referred to as SATAWU) 
under the RGA.  The plaintiff secured temporary employment as a replacement employee at a 
company in Springs during a nationwide strike organised by SATAWU in 2006.  
The plaintiff was accosted by members of SATAWU outside her workplace in 
Springs.  The members of SATAWU were armed with sticks and sjamboks.  The aim was to 
have the plaintiff travel with them to Johannesburg.  When the group of SATAWU members 
and the plaintiff boarded a train at Springs, the plaintiff was stripped naked, assaulted with 
weapons and thrown off the moving train.  The plaintiff sustained injuries and therefore 
instituted an action for damages against SATAWU under section 11 of the RGA.   
The court narrowed down the issues and established that in order for the plaintiff 
to succeed in her action she had to prove firstly that there was a “gathering” as defined in the 
RGA, secondly that she was injured as a result of the conduct of the SATAWU members and 
thirdly that the damage she suffered was causally linked to the conduct of the SATAWU 
members.119 
In applying the RGA the court noted that the purpose of the RGA was to 
“regulate the holding of gatherings at certain places.”120  The court further noted that 
“gatherings” are defined as: “any assembly, concourse or procession of more than 15 persons 
in or on any public road as defined in the Road Traffic Act (Act 29 of 1989) or any other public 
place or premises wholly or partly open to the air.”121 The court was of the view that the riot 
damage that occurs must be at the location where the gathering is taking place.  The court 
concluded that the damages suffered by the plaintiff did not take place at a “gathering” 
therefore the plaintiff’s case was dismissed.  What can also be observed from this judgment is 
how replacement employees are often the cause of strike violence.  The link between 
replacement employees and strike violence will be investigated under chapter 4 of this 
dissertation.   
The court further reasoned that SATAWU, the organisers of the gathering could 
not have reasonably foreseen that its members in Springs would cause riot damage for a 
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gathering taking place in Johannesburg.  In this case it is also evident that striking workers 
were hostile towards replacement labour however the court did not examine the link between 
the violent assault and the use of replacement labour.  This case clearly indicates that although 
trade unions may be held liable for not being in control of strikes that become violent as was 
the case in SATAWU v Garvas122 the requirements for liability are very exacting under the 
RGA. 
It must be emphasised that the RGA provides specific recourse to litigants in 
the form of damages to those affected by riot damage.  The RGA is not an instrument to be 
used directly in the employment context.  This was the issue in ADT Security (Pty) Ltd v 
National Security and Unqualified Workers Union (NASUWU)123.  The appellant in this matter 
was the employer of ADT Security (Pty) Ltd.  The appellant approached the Labour Court to 
obtain an interdict prohibiting its employees from engaging in a march to the appellants head 
offices under the RGA.  The purpose of the march was to address, amongst other issues, 
organisational rights with the appellant.   
The appellant sought to obtain an interdict against the march arguing that it was 
unlawful because it bypassed the dispute resolution procedures of the LRA.  Section 22 of the 
LRA makes provision for the acquisition and determination of organisational rights disputes.  
In addition, section 64 of the LRA creates a process for employees to embark on a strike.  The 
appellant argued that these procedures were being bypassed by the respondent union.   
In deciding this issue, the court made reference to and endorsed the views of the 
Constitutional Court in Sidumo and another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd124 in which the 
court regarded the LRA as a “specialised negotiated legislation giving effect to the right to fair 
labour practices.”125  The Court also referred to Chriwa v Transnet Ltd126 in which the court 
opined “that the existence of a purpose-built framework in the form of the LRA and associated 
legislation implies that labour processes and forums should take precedence over non-purpose-
built processes and forums in situations involving employment related matters.”127  The 
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principle of utilising the correct forum to obtain relief was also discussed in Gcaba v Minister 
for Safety and Security128 where the court held:  
The legislature is sometimes specifically mandated to create detailed legislation for a particular 
area, like equality, just administrative action (PAJA) and labour relations (LRA).  Once a set 
of carefully crafted rules and structures has been created for the effective and speedy resolution 
of disputes and protection of rights in a particular area of law, it is preferable to use that 
particular system.129 
Hlope AJA concluded that the respondent trade union in the ADT case ought to 
have utilised the processes contained in the LRA to pursue organisational rights.   In the 
employment context it is imperative that parties seek redress first from the applicable labour 
legislation rather than circumventing the legislation which may lead to an unwanted result.   
 
2.5 Conclusion: 
This chapter demonstrates that strike violence in South Africa is not a new phenomenon but 
has been a feature of the workplace since industrialisation.  History illustrates that strike 
violence was caused by the prevailing social, political and economic order.   
The government adopted a reactive approach to industrial unrest by 
implementing laws that curtailed strikes.  In the years that followed, social unrest and the quest 
for democracy in South Africa gave rise to growing militancy from the oppressed black 
majority and increasing international pressure that placed a strain on the government. 
The Wiehahn Commission of enquiry maintained that all workers be allowed to 
exercise the right to strike.  These factors contributed to the change from the Apartheid regime 
to a democratic state governed by the Constitution which allowed for the creation of specific 
legislation that regulated strikes.  However, despite the efforts of the legislature to promulgate 
labour legislation, recent history depicts that strikes are increasingly violent.  This had led 
courts to find trade unions liable under the LRA and the RGA for the unruly and riotous 
behaviour of its members. 
In the next chapter an analysis of the legislation dealing with strike violence is 
undertaken.  The purpose of this chapter is to show that despite having a structured legislative 
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framework regulating protected strikes, strikes turn violent thereby causing damage and harm 































THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
 
 
3.1 Introduction:   
This chapter will start by analysing the “right to strike” as provided in the Constitution.130  The 
Labour Relations Act131  will also be analysed and highlighted as the key legislation that 
regulates strikes and provides recourse to those that suffer because of violent strikes. The laws 
in South Africa will be analysed to determine whether an adequate regulatory framework is 
provided.  It will be argued that the laws create a balance between an employee’s right to strike 
as well as recourse to the employer if strike laws are not complied with.  Furthermore, it will 
be demonstrated that the Constitution, the LRA, and case law create an environment where the 
right and freedom to strike is promoted rather than curtailed.     
 
3.2 The Constitution: 
3.2.1 Section 23 (2) (c): The right to strike  
The legal hierarchy in South Africa is predicated by the Constitution which establishes itself 
“as the supreme law of the Republic”132 and which states that “law or conduct inconsistent with 
it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.”133  The Constitution makes 
provision for “fair labour practices” in terms of section 23.  In terms of this section, “every 
worker has the right to strike.”134  The right to strike is “generally considered a vital adjunct to 
the right to bargain collectively.”135 The right to strike is fundamental to the protection of the 
interest of employees. 136  Under the LRA of 1956 employees were not free to engage in strike 
action, as such conduct was criminalised.137  Employees were also not free to engage in 
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collective bargaining with the employer.  This was changed with the entrenchment of the right 
to strike in the Constitution.  The right to strike is regulated by the LRA of 1995.  Whereas in 
the past employees could be dismissed due to breach of contract employees are now insulated 
by the right to strike which is given effect to by the LRA.138 
When dealing with an objection to the exclusion of a right to lockout as opposed 
to the inclusion of the right to strike, the court remarked that “collective bargaining is based on 
the recognition of the fact that employers enjoy greater social and economic power than 
individual workers.”139 It was, therefore, justifiable to provide workers with the right to strike 
and employers with recourse to lockout.  It is argued that the law adequately regulates the right 
to strike if one considers that the drafters of the Constitution had the insight to perceive the 
imbalance of power between employers and employees and provided employees with a right 
to strike.  In addition to an employer’s recourse to lock-out, employers have many other 
remedies at their disposal when dealing with striking employees.  Employers can dismiss 
employees for misconduct or retrench based on operational requirements.  Employers may 
approach the Labour Court for an interdict to restrain striking employees or to seek 
compensation for a strike that does not comply with the LRA.  In addition, employers may 
engage replacement employees to do the work of striking employees.  In sharp contrast to the 
employer’s remedies, employees can only go on strike to remedy demands or grievances. 
Creamer regards the protection of the right to strike as opposed to an employer’s 
recourse to lock-out as a “decisive shift - from a symmetrical to an asymmetrical regulation of 
industrial action - which, it is argued, is required for the creation of increased substantive parity 
in the collective bargaining relationship.”140 Creamer’s argument implies that for there to be 
substantive equality between employers and employees it is necessary to treat employers 
differently and to this extent, the Constitution adequately regulates the right to strike.  
According to Creamer:  
In terms of the substantive parity approach, constitutional rights are a means for the 
establishment of conditions for greater equality and equal participation in social and economic 
                                                          
138 Ibid.   
139 Ibid. 
140 Kenneth Creamer “The meaning and implications of the inclusion of the right to strike and the exclusion of 
lock-out right: Towards asymmetrical parity in the regulation of industrial action.” (1998) 19(1) Industrial Law 
Journal 1; 20. 
26 
 
life.  This commitment must find expression through laws that have as their objective the 
amelioration of the conditions of those who find themselves in positions of disadvantage.141 
Therefore, Creamers approach to asymmetrical parity is interpreted to mean that 
in order to express substantive parity it is necessary that the right to strike is protected rather 
than elevating the employers recourse to lock-out.  In short, Creamer posits that: “substantive 
parity requires that different rules should apply to employers and employees engaged in 
collective bargaining.”142 
It may be inferred from this reasoning that section 23 of the Constitution was 
drafted taking cognisance of the difference in power between employers and employees and 
therefore promotes the right to strike in favour of employees.  Martin Brassey comments as 
follows:  
That the two [the lock-out and the strike] should be treated differently is not purely a matter of 
historical accident or political expediency.  Formally they may seem symmetrical, but in 
practice, they play very different roles.  When employers want to change terms of employment, 
they do not reach for the lock-out; provided they negotiate to impasse first, they can implement 
the changes unilaterally. Then, if the workers refuse to accept the changes, the law gives their 
employer the right to retrench or dismiss them. If they refuse to leave the premises, the law 
provides a range of sanctions that range from judicial interdicts to the police baton. The strike, 
in contrast, is the only means, short of resignation, by which workers can change their lot. It is 
the way they fend off exploitation and give teeth to the demands that they make at the 
bargaining table. For them, it is a vital necessity, for the employers just an optional extra. By 
giving collective rights only to workers the law seems to favour them at the expense of their 
employers.143 
Therefore, it is argued, that from a Constitutional perspective, the right to strike 
is adequately regulated in South Africa.  The right to strike has also been interpreted as 
“promoting the dignity of workers in a constitutional democracy so that workers are not treated 
as coerced employees.”144  The Constitutional right to strike is not absolute and, like any other 
right in the Bill of Rights may be limited in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.   
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3.2.2 Section 23 (5) Collective bargaining:  
To understand how the Constitution adequately regulates the right to strike, it is 
important to understand the concept of collective bargaining.  It will be argued that when there 
is a breakdown of the collective bargaining relationship, employees’ resort to strike action, and 
thus collective bargaining is a necessary precursor to strikes. 
The Constitution provides in this regard that “every trade union, employers’ 
organisation and employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining.”145  Collective 
bargaining is defined as “the process by which employers and organised groups of employees 
seek to reconcile their conflicting goals through mutual accommodation.”146 Collective 
bargaining is a process of demand and concession with the objective of reaching agreement.  
Thus, the aim of collective bargaining is to reach an equitable settlement on matters of mutual 
interest through negotiations.  Collective bargaining assumes that there is a willingness of both 
parties to listen to each other as well as consider the representations made by each side.   
Collective bargaining is of importance to the right to strike as “[…] the right to strike 
is indivisibly bound with the right to bargain collectively.”147  If the process of collective 
bargaining is one that operates on the premise of addressing matters of mutual interest and the 
terms and conditions of employment, it must follow therefore that should the collective 
bargaining process fail, there must be remedies for the employees to exercise in order to have 
their grievances addressed.  Collective bargaining is constitutionally entrenched in section 23 
(5) of the Constitution.  In Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa148 it was maintained that: 
Collective bargaining is based on the recognition of the fact that employers enjoy greater social 
and economic power than individual workers. Workers, therefore, need to act in concert to 
provide them collectively with sufficient power to bargain effectively with employers. Workers 
exercise collective power primarily through the mechanism of strike action.149 
The Constitution adequately regulates strikes by entrenching the right to 
collective bargaining in section 23 (5).  Collective bargaining is the necessary precursor to 
strikes.  The law encourages agreement between the parties through collective bargaining. If 
an agreement cannot be reached; employees may strike to have their demands addressed.  It 
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has been outlined that the aim of collective bargaining is to reach an equitable settlement on  
matters of mutual interest through negotiations which must be conducted peacefully.  “The 
economic pressure meant to be put on the employer as a result of a strike is sufficient and 
functional to collective bargaining.”150  It is argued that the mere withholding of labour is 
sufficient for the purposes of collective bargaining. 
According to Botha and Germishuys: “The pressure placed on the employer 
because of the violence and not as a result of the strike, forces the employer to reach agreement.  
This means that the employer is placed under economic duress.”151  It is argued, that when 
striking employees use violence in the context of a strike it has the effect of giving the 
employees the unfair advantage of “economic duress” to secure their demands therefore the 
use of violence during a strike can never be functional to collective bargaining.  The courts 
have gone as far as enquiring into whether a strike which is not functional to collective 
bargaining should be protected under the LRA.  For a discussion regarding the functionality of 
a strike to collective bargaining please see chapter 5.   
3.3  The Labour Relations Act: 
The LRA is specific legislation that regulates strikes in South Africa.  An analysis of the LRA 
will be undertaken to depict how this legislation regulates the right to strike.  The LRA must 
be interpreted “to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 23 of 
the Constitution.”152  In addition, the LRA endeavours to “regulate the right to strike.”153  
Crucial to the assessment of the right to strike is its correlation to the idea of collective 
bargaining and thus the LRA endeavours to “promote and facilitate collective bargaining in the 
workplace and at a sectorial level.”154  It will be demonstrated that the LRA creates a 
framework that adequately regulates strikes by providing substantive requirements and 
procedural preconditions that must be satisfied before a strike complies with the LRA.  When 
these requirements are complied with the strike is regarded as being “protected” in terms of 
section 67 (1) of the LRA and enjoys the protections afforded to striking employees by the 
LRA.  Should a strike not comply with the requirements of the LRA the strike will be regarded 
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as “unprotected” and consequences may follow.  It is noteworthy to mention that the word 
“unprotected” does not appear in the LRA and is used as a contrast to a “protected strike”.  The 
LRA also provides limitations and recourse to employers if strikes do not satisfy the substantive 
requirements or the procedural preconditions.    
 
3.3.1 Definition of a strike:  
For a strike to be protected it must adhere to the definition of section 213 of the LRA:  
the partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of work, by 
persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or by different employers, for 
the purpose of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual 
interest between employer and employee and every reference to ‘work’ in this definition 
includes overtime work whether it is voluntary or compulsory.155 
From this definition, it is deduced that there are distinct elements that comprise 
a strike.  To understand the definition of a strike, certain essential elements to this definition 
must be highlighted and discussed below.   
 
3.3.2 “The partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation 
or obstruction of work (…)”:  
The employment relationship is characterised by the principle of labour and reward.  Grogan 
describes it as: 
A contract between two persons, the master (employer) and the servant (employee), for the 
letting and hiring of the latter's services for reward, the master being able to supervise and 
control the servant's work.156  
An employee is bound by a contract of employment to render services to the 
employer in exchange for remuneration, when an employee stops working or refuses to work, 
this constitutes an element of a strike.  The stoppage must be for work that the employee is 
contractually obliged to do and that such work is legal.157  The definition also includes the 
“retardation” or “obstruction” of work.  The retardation of work occurs where employees slow 
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down normal production for example in the case of National Union of Mineworkers v Chrober 
Slate (Pty) Ltd158. The mine workers excavated slate but refused to allow this slate to be loaded 
by drivers until the employer provided a front-end loader to assist.  The court found that this 
was a retardation of work.159  The obstruction of work is for example where off duty employees 
block access to the company premises or intimidate fellow workers from complying with their 
duties.160  Where employees prevent other employees from working or commence a “go-slow” 
where their duties will be done at a reduced pace so as to hinder the employer’s operational 
capacity is conduct that constitutes a strike.161 
According to Grogan: “when two or more employees down tools, their action 
constitutes a strike only if they act with a common purpose: they must have agreed to act in 
concert.”162 However section 23 of the Constitution provides that “Every employee has the 
right to strike.”  This must be understood in the context of the LRA which specifically defines 
a strike as being a concerted effort by employees.  Therefore, a single employee cannot go on 
strike.  Section 23 of the Constitution must be read with the LRA which explicitly requires two 
or more employees to go on strike as “according to the LRA, strikes are afforded full protection 
if the act constitutes a strike under the definition of the Labour Relations Act.”163 
 
3.3.3 “(…) by persons who are or were employed by the same employer 
or by different employers (…)”:  
This element is interpreted to include employees who are employed by an employer or who 
have been employed by that employer.  The latter applies to employees who have been 
dismissed and a dispute still exists with the employer.164  Importantly, the phrase makes it 
possible for employees employed by different employers to embark on a strike; this is known 
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as a secondary strike.  A secondary strike occurs where employees of one company (primary 
employees) embark on a protected strike and in solidarity, employees of a different company 
(secondary employees) joins a strike to support the primary employees.  Secondary strikes are 
regulated by section 66 of the LRA. 
In terms of section 66 (2) (a) of the LRA a secondary strike is only permissible 
if the strike at the primary employer is one that complies with sections 64 and 65 of the LRA.  
According to section 66 (2) (b) of the LRA secondary employees must notify the secondary 
employer in writing that they are going to embark on a secondary strike. In addition, section 
66 (2) (c) of the LRA provides that the “nature and extent of the secondary strike must be 
reasonable in relation to the impact that the secondary strike may have on the business of the 
primary employer.”   
 
3.3.4 “(…) for the purpose of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute 
in respect of any matter of mutual interest between the employer and 
employee (…)”:  
This element goes to the core of the reason to strike.  A strike must be for the “purpose of 
remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual interest 
between the employer and employee.”165 
The LRA envisages that employees may go on strike for a multiplicity of 
reasons that pertain to the employment relationship.  It is important to emphasise that the 
purpose of a strike is twofold, it must be to remedy a grievance between an employer and an 
employee alternatively it must be to resolve a dispute between the employer and employee.  
The reasons for embarking on a strike are not easy to distinguish, as a “matter 
of mutual interest” may be described as a: “sweeping phrase seemingly encompassing issues 
of employment in general, and is not limited strictly to matters pertaining to wages and 
conditions of service.”166 A matter of mutual interest is therefore an issue between the 
employee and employer.  The term matter of mutual interest could cover a wide variety of 
issues that affect the employment relationship which enables employees to go on strike.   
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In the case of Pikitup (SOC) Ltd v South African Municipal Workers Union on 
behalf of Members & Others167 the employer introduced a breathalyser test to investigate 
employees who reported for work under the influence of alcohol.  If the test indicated a positive 
reading for alcohol consumption the employee could have a second attempt at the test or to 
undertake an intravenous blood alcohol test.   
Aggrieved by the implementation of the test the employees chose to embark on 
a strike to persuade the employer not to implement breathalyser testing.  The employer 
approached the Labour Court to interdict employees from striking as the introduction of the 
breathalyser test was an operational management measure.  The Labour Court initially granted 
an interim interdict on the basis that the demand made to the employer was not a matter of 
mutual interest but rather an operational management measure.  
On the return date, the Labour Court held that the requirement to have 
employees undergo a breathalyser test and subsequently an intravenous blood alcohol test was 
a matter of workplace health and safety which was of interest to both employer and employee..  
The Labour Court refused to make the interdict final.   
Aggrieved the employer applied to the Labour Appeal Court to rule on whether 
the requirement to undergo a breathalyser test was a legitimate operational management 
measure or a matter of mutual interest, the latter of which enabled the employees to go on 
strike.  Musi AJA noted that the term matter of mutual interest “defies precise definition.”168  
The court accepted Grogan’s definition169 of a matter of mutual interest which 
is “any matter which affects employees in the workplace however indirectly, falls within the 
scope of the phrase “matters of mutual interest” and may accordingly form the subject matter 
of strike action.” 170 The Labour Appeal Court stipulated that mutual interest issues must relate 
to the employment relationship: 
The phrase mutual interest seeks to limit the issues that may form the subject matter of a strike.  
It can therefore not be without boundary.  The matter should not be too far removed from the 
employment relationship so that it can properly be said that it does not concern the employment 
relationship.  Matters that are purely socio-economic or political would generally not be matters 
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of mutual interest […] The facts of each matter will determine whether such issue is one of 
mutual interest.171 
Applying this principle to the facts of the case, the court concluded that “health 
and safety issues are primarily the responsibility of the employer but they are matters of mutual 
interest over which the parties may engage in collective bargaining and if they cannot agree 
the employees may embark on strike action”172 Therefore, the appeal was dismissed with costs, 
such costs to include the costs occasioned by the employment of two counsel.173 
The reasons that can give rise to a strike are broad.  Employees have the latitude 
to engage in strikes if the reason for the strike pertains to the employment relationship.  The 
common law position in the Rand Tyres v Industrial Council for the Motor Industry 
(Transvaal)174 decision indicates that the right to strike should not be unnecessarily curtailed.  
Therefore, it is argued that the LRA adequately regulates the right to strike by providing a wide 
scope of reasons that employees may strike for.  
In as much as the right to strike is defined very broadly in the Constitution and 
the LRA, the right to strike cannot be exercised in an unfettered manner.  The LRA provides 
for procedures and limitations to strike which will be discussed below.   
 
3.4 Procedure for participating in a strike: 
Section 64 of the LRA provides procedures that need to be complied with to ensure that a strike 
enjoys legal protection.  According to the LRA, employees may only strike “if the issue in 
dispute175 has been referred to a council or to the Commission.”176  The purpose of referring a 
dispute is to compel parties to negotiate with a view of resolving the issue in dispute before a 
strike is declared.177  This indicates that the LRA adequately regulates the right to strike by 
requiring parties to exhaust negotiations before a dispute is referred.   
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Employees have thirty days178 since the referral of the dispute to strike,179 
regardless of whether a conciliation meeting takes place.  Allowing employees thirty days 
suggests that a decision to strike must be taken carefully as there may be consequences.  It is 
argued that the LRA adequately regulates the right to strike by stipulating that time must pass 
before the decision to strike is taken.   
In addition, employees who want to strike must provide the employer with “at 
least 48 hours’ notice of the commencement of the strike in writing.”180  The purpose of 
notifying the employer before the start of a strike is to warn employers that a strike is going to 
commence and to prepare for the impending power play.181 Thus, the LRA not only promotes 
the right to strike but is cognisant of the employers business operations.  Notifying the 
employer before the strike is a measure to warn the employer that a strike is due to commence.     
When interpreting the right to strike according to the procedural preconditions, 
the courts have adopted an approach that is least restrictive to the right to strike.182 The 
procedural preconditions must be interpreted considering the disparities between employees 
and employers. The LRA was created as a measure of redress.183  Therefore, it is clear that the 
LRA adequately regulates the right to strike by setting out a simple procedure that must be 
complied with.  The courts interpret these procedures considering promoting the right to strike 
and ensuring equity between employers and employees.  
The reason for the procedures is to ensure peaceful and orderly collective 
bargaining.184 This forms the basis of the LRA in relation to the regulation of strikes.  In this 
regard, it is argued that the procedural preconditions of the LRA adequately regulates the right 
to strike.   
Compliance with the requirements also ensures that the strike itself is protected 
thus allowing employees to strike without fear of consequences. 
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3.5 Limitations to the right to strike: 
The right to strike cannot be exercised without limitation.  There are instances where employees 
are limited from striking, these limitations are important and necessary to ensure that strikes 
only occur when they are legally permissible and the grievance or demand constitute a matter 
of mutual interest as discussed in 3.4 above.  The LRA provides the following limitations as to 
when employees cannot strike; these include:  
Where a “collective agreement” is in place or still in force in that “prohibits” 
the right to strike.185 A collective agreement entered into freely and voluntarily between 
employers and trade unions on behalf of employees are binding.  The parties can agree that the 
employees will not strike, and the employers will not impose a lock-out.  The courts give 
legitimacy to collective agreements186 a strike that takes place contrary to a collective 
agreement will be unprotected.  
A limitation also applies where there is an agreement in place that would have 
the “issue in dispute referred to arbitration.”187    Disputes that must be arbitrated include an 
employers’ right to freedom of association188, the interpretation and application of collective 
agreements.189 Disputes about the interpretation and application of agency shop and closed 
shop agreements must be arbitrated.190 Organisational rights disputes must be arbitrated with 
the exception of sections 12- 15 of the LRA which make provision for employees to embark 
on a strike.  
The Labour Relations Amendment Act 8 of 2018 provides, in section 150A for 
an advisory arbitration panel appointed in the public interest to arbitrate issues of dispute.  Prior 
to these amendments’ issues of matter of mutual interest could only be ventilated by way of a 
strike.  These amendments will be discussed in Chapter 5 below.   
The right to strike is further limited where employees are engaged in “essential” 
or “maintenance services.”191  An essential service is defined as “a service, the interruption of 
which endangers the life, personal safety or health of the whole or any part of the population 
and includes the parliamentary service and the South African Police Service.”192  It is therefore 
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reasonable when human life, security and safety is at risk that essential service employees are 
precluded from going on strike.   
Where a collective agreement applies, or the matter is determined by an 
“arbitration award.”193 If the issue in dispute has been resolved through arbitration the matter 
is now final unless the employees review the case in the Labour Court.  Employees are 
rightfully precluded from embarking on a strike once the matter has been arbitrated as there 
will no longer be an issue in dispute.194 
In addition, if a determination is made by the Minister of Labour in terms of the 
Wage Act195 employees are prohibited from striking because the Wage Act is an act of 
parliament it is not a matter that the employee will be in dispute with the employer over.   
The LRA adequately controls the right to strike by streamlining the reasons that 
employees choose to go on strike.  It is argued that the limitations are a measure to curb 
unnecessary and unprocedural strike action.196 
 
 
3.6 Protection to the right to strike:  
Provided that a strike complies with the procedures enumerated in section 64 (1) of the LRA 
and is not limited by section 65 (1) of the LRA protected strikes are regulated by section 67 of 
the LRA.  The right to strike is supported by providing protection to employees who choose to 
strike by immunising them against dismissal, delict or breach of contract for participating in a 
protected strike if section 64 of the LRA is complied with. 
The employer is not obliged to pay employees who are on strike.  This is 
provided for in section 67 (3) of the LRA and is also firmly rooted in South African common 
law.  According to Grogan: “The legal basis for exempting employers of the obligation to pay 
striking employees is that employees who are on strike are by definition not discharging their 
obligation to tender service.”197  The principle of no work no pay is a trite principle in South 
African labour law as posited by Basson J in South African Municipal Workers Union v 
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Ekhuruleni Metropolitan Municipality198: “In respect of the practice of “no work for no pay”, 
it is trite that this practice arises from the principle that an employee is to tender his/her services 
to the employer in return for payment of his/her salary.”199 
  The no work for no pay principle is without exception as section 67(3)(a) 
provides that an employer “must not discontinue payments made in kind during the strike” such 
as “accommodation, the provision of food and other basic amenities of life.”200  Should an 
employer deem necessary, the LRA makes provision for the recovery of a payment made in 
kind “after the end of the strike.”201 
“An employer may not dismiss an employee for participating in a protected 
strike”202 or for “conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a protected strike.”203 Section 
67 (4) is reinforced by section 187 (1) (a) of the LRA which makes the dismissal of employees 
who embark on a protected strike automatically unfair.  In Edelweiss Glass & Aluminium (Pty) 
Ltd v NUMSA & Others204 the employees were on a protected strike that complied with section 
64 of the LRA.  The reason for the strike was initially regarding organisational rights.  
However, during the strike employees included a further demand of a 13th cheque.  The 
employer viewed this demand as being a new issue because only the issue of organisational 
rights was conciliated at the CCMA.  The employer issued an ultimatum to which the 
employees ignored and subsequently dismissed the employees for participating in an 
unprotected strike.   
The Labour Appeal Court ruled, that due to the unique facts of the case it was 
to be expected that the employees would change their demands during the strike and that the 
employees were entitled to do so, this meant that the strike was protected and the dismissal of 
the employees for participating in a protected strike was automatically unfair.  The Labour 
Appeal Court upheld the order of the Labour Court which included retrospective reinstatement.   
The section makes an important qualification in that “subsection (4) does not 
preclude an employer from fairly dismissing an employee in accordance with the provisions of 
Chapter VIII for the reason related to the employee’s conduct during the strike, or for a reason 
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based on the employer’s operational requirements.”205  This provision is important when 
dealing with the question of strike violence as it provides the employer with recourse when 
dealing with violent employees. Thus, an employer may not dismiss an employee for the act of 
participating in a protected strike however an employer may dismiss an employee for his or her 
conduct during a strike or based on the operational requirements of the employer.  “In other 
words, a protected strike does not protect employees against the consequences of any 
misconduct.”206  Therefore employees may be dismissed for misconduct during a strike and 
“nor does a protected strike suspend the employers right to retrench employees for genuine 
operational reasons, even if the operational problems were caused by the strike.”207  Common 
types of misconduct that may constitute grounds for dismissal of employees participating in a 
protected strike include, but are not limited to assault, intimidation and damage to company 
property.  The employer is within their right to institute disciplinary action against transgressors 
in terms of Chapter VIII of the LRA and in accordance with the Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal.208 
Regardless of being protected, misconduct during a strike is punishable.  In 
Arnolds & Coca Cola (Lakeside) 209 during a protected strike Mr Arnold was aware of a plan 
to bomb a co-employee’s home.  Mr Arnold was aware of the plan and did not inform the 
employer.  The employee was dismissed due to this misconduct.  The Commissioner concluded 
that the dismissal was substantively fair.   
In National Democratic Change and Allied Workers Union & Others v 
Cummins Emission Solutions210 the employees were on a protected strike in the automotive 
sector.  Various acts of intimidation and assault took place that resulted in the dismissal of 
employees.  The employees referred a case to the Motor Industry Bargaining Council claiming 
that their dismissal was automatically unfair in terms of section 187 (1) (a) of the LRA.  The 
employees were referred to the Labour Court where they could not prove that they were 
automatically unfairly dismissed on account of them participating in a protected strike.  The 
court confirmed that the employees were fairly dismissed due to misconduct arising from a 
protected strike. 
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An employer may also retrench employees during a protected strike due to the 
employer’s operational requirements.  The requirements for retrenching employees are to be 
found in sections 189 and 189A of the Labour Relations Act.  Similar to dismissals due to 
misconduct during a protected strike, employees cannot be retrenched for participation in a 
strike.   
An example of retrenching employees during a protected strike can be found in 
the case of SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox211 the employees who were employed as 
drivers embarked on a protected strike regarding the regulation of overtime at the workplace.  
During the course of the strike the employer consulted with the striking employees relating to 
the engagement of contractors to do the work of drivers if they refuse to work the proposed 
staggered shift system.  The employees refused and were subsequently retrenched.  The 
employees claimed at the Labour Court that they were retrenched for participating in a 
protected strike.   
The court indicated that in order to establish whether employees were 
retrenched for the act of participating in a legal strike is a factual question that must be 
answered objectively.212  The court looked at the factual circumstances of the case and 
established that the employees were not retrenched due to their participation in a protected 
strike.  Evidence before the court indicated that the employees were consulted about the 
possibility of engaging contract drivers well before the strike commenced.  It is apparent from 
this case that the courts will look at the employer’s decision to retrench alongside the facts of 
the case and what the true cause of the retrenchment was.  213Retrenchment due to operational 
requirements may take place when workers are on a protected strike. 
Another example of where employers have undertaken retrenchments during a 
protected strike is the case of NUM v Black Mountain Mineral Development Company (Pty) 
Ltd.  The employer was in the business of mining and was in a poor financial situation.  During 
the annual wage negotiations the employees and employer reached a stalemate on the amount 
of the wage increase.  The employees were aware of the poor financial position of employer 
but nevertheless embarked on a protected strike.214  Whilst the employees were on strike the 
employer initiated retrenchments.215 
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The key issue before the court was whether the retrenchments were as a result 
of the employees embarking on a strike or whether the retrenchments were as a result of 
“irreparable economic hardship”216 that necessitated the retrenchments.  The court held that an 
employer “need not wait for his doors to close before making the decision to retrench.”217 The 
court further added that “it would be preferable to hold that the likelihood of substantial 
economic loss would entitle an employer to protect its business by exercising its right to dismiss 
striking workers.”218  This judgment indicates that although the timing of retrenchments during 
a protected strike may be questionable, it is imperative to determine whether the probability of 
substantial economic loss justifies the retrenchment.   
A more recent example of an employer undertaking retrenchments during a 
protected strike is the case of NUMSA v Dorbyl Ltd219                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
where the employer was in the bus manufacturing industry and experienced “serious financial 
challenges.”220  Despite the financial challenges the employer and employees reached a 
deadlock during the annual wage increase.  The employees embarked on a protected strike 
despite management cautioning them that the financial situation of the business was very 
poor.221  Whilst the employees were on strike the employer initiated retrenchments.  The 
employees perceived that the retrenchments were caused because the employees embarked on 
a strike and pursued the matter in the Labour Courts.   
According to the court, “the crisp issue on appeal was what was the dominant 
reason for the dismissal? Was it more probable that the dominant or main reason for the 
dismissal was a variety of proper operational requirements and not the strike itself?”222  In 
arriving at its decision the court was satisfied that the need to retrench pre-dated the strike.223  
The court reasoned that “although the individual appellants participation in the strike 
contributed to, or accelerated, the decision to dismiss, it was not the dominant reason for the 
dismissal.”224  The cases discussed pertaining to the retrenchment of striking employees makes 
it clear that an employer is empowered to retrench during a protected strike, however if 
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challenged that retrenchments were in response to a strike the courts will look at the dominant 
reason that resulted in the retrenchments.   
The LRA provision on protected strikes prevents employers from instituting 
civil legal proceedings against employees “who participate in a protected strike or in any 
conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a protected strike.”225  Employees are protected 
against claims for damages if they participate in a strike that complies with the LRA.  As will 
be discussed further, this right is not without limitations and goes to the core of the way strikes 
take place.  The LRA unequivocally states that subsections 67(2) and 67(6) “do not apply to 
any act in contemplation or in furtherance of a strike or lock-out, if that act is an offence.”226   
Critics to the strike provisions of the LRA, such as Puke Maserumule argue that 
the LRA does not create a positive right to strike but rather enforces compliance with the 
LRA.227  This view is myopic and fails to take cognisance of the positive rights put in place by 
the LRA as outlined above.  It is argued that the LRA adequately regulates the right to strike.   
 
3.7 Unprotected strikes:  
As discussed above, the LRA provides procedures that need to be complied with for a strike to 
be protected.  Protection entails immunity from criminal and civil liability if employees do not 
commit misconduct or commit an offence.  Not complying with the procedures stipulated in 
section 64 and 65 of the LRA results in a strike being unprotected.  Section 68 of the LRA 
provides remedies to employers in the event that the procedures for a protected strike are not 
complied with.  The LRA provides remedies to employers if a strike does not comply with the 
provisions of the LRA.  
In Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v Mouthpiece Workers Union228 the trade 
union had a list of demands and requested all its members to not tender their services until their 
demands were satisfied.  A meeting was called with the trade union who conceded that the 
strike was unprotected.  The employer approached the Labour Court for compensation in terms 
of section 68 (1) (b) of the LRA.   
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Farber J outlined three requirements that needed to be satisfied before liability 
is established:  
It is manifest that in relation to a strike, three requirements must be satisfied before the question 
of whether compensation as contemplated in terms of subsection (1)(b) is to be awarded, and, 
if so in what amount, arises for determination.  In the first instance it must be established that 
the strike does not comply with the provisions of chapter IV of the Act.  Secondly, the party 
invoking the remedy must establish that it sustained loss in consequence of the strike.  Thirdly 
it must be demonstrated that the party sought to be fixed with liability participated in the strike 
or committed acts in contemplation or furtherance thereof.229 
  If these requirements are satisfied a trade union and its members will be held 
liable for compensation.  In this case the union was found to have not complied with the 
requirements of section 64 and section 65 of the LRA.  The court awarded compensation in the 
amount of R100 000.00 which was to be paid in instalments of R5000.00 per month.  The 
employer initially claimed losses of R15 000 000.00 but later reduced its claim to R100 000.00. 
 
3.8 Remedies: 
The following section deals with remedies, in particular interdicts, compensation and 
dismissals. 
3.8.1 Interdict: 
An interdict is a remedy available to prevent strike violence.  Section 68 (1) (a) of the LRA 
enables the employer to apply for an interdict to restrain striking employees who do not comply 
with chapter IV of the LRA.  The Labour Court “has exclusive jurisdiction - (a) to grant an 
interdict in order to restrain – (i) any person from participating in a strike or any conduct in 
contemplation or in furtherance of a strike.”230  Interdicts are defined as “a common law remedy 
aimed at protecting applicants from suffering irreparable damage caused by the wrongful 
activities of defendants.”231  Applied to the employment context the employer may apply for 
an interdict when its rights to property and safety are violated by striking employees.   
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For an employer to obtain an interdict, the following must be established:  
• A reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm that will be suffered should the interdict 
not be granted. 
• That the applicant has no other satisfactory remedy and, 
• That the balance of convenience favours the applicant.232 
In South African Post Office v TAS Appointment and management services CC 
and Others233  the workers were employees of a temporary employment service who provided 
services to the South African post office.  
They embarked on an unlawful strike with the demand of obtaining permanent 
employment with the South African Post Office.  The undisputed evidence before the court 
was that the strike was characterised by unlawful conduct.  The court granted the interdict to 
restrain the striking workers from participating in the unprotected strike.  
The South African Post Office was not the employer but could demonstrate that 
it suffered harm at the hands of the unprotected strikers.  This serves to show that it is not only 
an employer who may seek remedy under section 68 (1) (a) of the LRA.     
If a strike becomes violent in breach of the LRA, “the Labour Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction to grant an interdict or order to restrain.”234  An interdict prohibits 
employees from committing violence.  If an interdict is breached, employees can be charged 
for contempt of court which is a criminal offence.  A fine or imprisonment may be imposed for 
breach of an interdict.235 In the case of In2Food (Pty) Ltd v Food and Allied Workers Union,236 
the court found that the union was in contempt for not complying with an interdict and imposed 
a fine of R500 000, 00.  The court remarked that, 
The time has come in our labour relations history that trade unions should be held accountable 
for the actions of their members.  For too long trade unions have glibly washed their hands of 
the violent actions of their members […] These actions undermine the very essence of 
disciplined collective bargaining and the very substructure of our labour relations regime.237 
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This indicates the courts’ proclivity to impose penalties on those who do not 
comply with its orders during violent strikes.  This matter was successfully appealed238 on the 
basis that the employer could not establish a breach of the interdict, however, the Labour 
Appeal Court did not interfere with the above statement and regarded it as an “important 
policy statement.”239 It is clear that an interdict is an option to curtail violent strikes.    
The Labour Court’s approach to enforcing an interdict in the context of breach 
of picketing rules was decided in the case of Verulam Sawmills (Pty) Ltd v AMCU.240 The 
employees initiated a protected strike.  During the strike, workers became aggressive, 
damaging property, blocking entrances to and from the employer’s premises as well as 
intimidating non-striking workers.  The strike was regulated by picketing rules that were 
devised by the employer and the trade union.  The employer cautioned workers that it would 
enforce the picketing agreement by applying for an interdict and seek costs against the trade 
union.  At the Labour Court, the trade union did not challenge the application for an interdict.  
The court likened strike violence to a “pandemic,”241 finding that a trade union 
has a duty to take “all reasonable steps”242 to ensure compliance with the picketing agreement.  
The court reasoned that the aim of picketing rules is to ensure safety.  If the non-striking 
workers who were being intimidated were to also withhold their labour it would be an unfair 
economic advantage over the employer.  In this case, the trade union was ordered to pay the 
employer’s costs on an attorney-client scale for not taking reasonable steps to prevent the 
violence.  The interdict was also upheld prohibiting workers from engaging in acts of violence.  
This case demonstrates that interdicts can be used as effective relief from strike.  
 However, while interdicts are legislated remedy to strike violence, thus far 
trade unions have mostly shown disrespect for interdicts.  This implies that interdicts may not 
be effective in curbing strike violence.  The key disadvantage of interdicts is that employees 
and their unions simply do not adhere to court orders which is of concern for preventing strike 
violence.  
The fact that interdicts are plainly ignored was evident in Pikitup Johannesburg 
(Pty) Ltd v SA Municipal Workers Union & Another243 violence exhibited by striking workers 
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had reached a point where workers blatantly disregarded the rule of law.  The workers trashed 
the streets by overturning bins and placing trees and debris on the road.  The workers went so 
far as to try and intimidate the presiding judge which resulted in the court having to clear the 
gallery of striking workers.244  Initially the matter came before the Labour Court on an urgent 
basis to restrain striking employees from engaging in acts of violence and intimidation.  An 
interim order was made by the Labour Court.  The very next day the employees engaged in 
unlawful acts of violence, damage to property and intimidation.   
Before dealing with the issue of whether the trade union was in contempt the 
Labour Court order, Lagrange J highlighted the importance of obeying court orders, it is 
necessary for the functioning of the rule of law in a democratic society.  From the cases 
discussed above, too often trade unions do not obey court orders.  Not obeying court orders is 
a sign of contempt for the authority of the courts and will lead to a state of lawlessness.   
On the issue of contempt of court, Lagrange J established that the trade union 
did not comply with the legal obligations imposed upon it by the Labour Court order.  The 
court ordered that “SAMWU is ordered to pay a fine of R80 000-00, which is suspended from 
the date of this order on condition the union is not found guilty of contempt of any order of this 
Court during that time.”245  
From the cases surveyed, interdicts are not obeyed, it is suggested that the courts 
take a more robust approach when penalising unions and employees for not adhering to its 
orders.  In this regard, Tenza argues that “as a court order, an interdict must be honoured.  It 
should be respected not only because it is a court order but as one of the founding values of our 
Constitution.”246  It is argued that indeed interdicts, as an instrument of the rule of law must be 
honoured, however in practice striking employees have shown a blatant disregard for the rule 
of law this begs the question of what more can be done to remedy violent strikes. 
Myburgh comments that “interdicts are not usually worth the paper they are 
written on (in the eyes of the perpetrators)”247and “have proven woefully inadequate.”248  In 
the light of excessive strike violence, Myburgh proposes that “where interdicts to stop strikes 
are not heeded-the only way to restore the collective bargaining position of the employer and 
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to prevent a continuation of economic duress […] is to suspend the strike.”249  According to 
Myburgh under the terminology “cooling off”250 is where the Labour Court may order the 
suspension of a violent strike “pending the union establishing that a resumption of the strike 
would be on a peaceful basis.”251  It is submitted suspending a strike on account of violence 
will be a viable option to remedy violent strikes.  The aim of an interdict is to restrain 
employees from committing acts of violence which has thus far been an ineffective remedy.  A 
court order that suspends a strike until the violence stops could be an effective way to stop 
violence as the strike would no longer be recognised as a strike until the violence ends.   
As an alternative to interdicts to remedy violent strikes, Fergus is of the view 
that: “Given the LRA’s purpose of advancing labour peace and orderly collective bargaining, 
as well as the right to strike is not unlimited, it is readily arguable that the statutory formulation 
of that right should be read as one which may only be exercised peacefully.”252  Fergus is of 
the view that the word “peaceful” must be read into the definition of a strike in terms of section 
213 of the LRA.  This viewpoint is also shared by Le Roux.253  This would imply that a strike 
could only be peaceful.  If violence is committed, then the conduct does not constitute a strike 
and would not enjoy the protection of the LRA.  It is argued that this would bring a swift end 





An employer may approach the Labour Court,254 to claim compensation due to losses that occur 
from an unprotected strike, due to the conduct of striking workers.  The Labour Court may 
award compensation that is “just and equitable.”255  The requirements to hold a union and its 
members liable for compensation have been outlined in 3.7 above.    
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In Mangaung Local Municipality v SAMWU & Others256 employees from the 
electricity department went on an unprotected strike.  This strike lasted 6 working days and 
consisted of blockading entrances to and from the workplace.  Employees were prevented from 
doing their duties, and those who continued working were paid overtime which financially 
affected the Mangaung municipality.  The employer made an application for compensation in 
terms of the LRA for losses sustained during the unprotected strike.  The union sought to 
distance itself from the unprotected strike.  Evidence indicated that the trade union did nothing 
to intervene in the strike when requested to do so by the employer.   
Thus, in the context of an unlawful strike, unions cannot simply distance 
themselves from the strike action.  According to the court :  
Where a trade union has a collective bargaining relationship with an employer, and its members 
embark on unprotected strike action and the union becomes aware of such unprotected strike 
action and is requested to intervene but fails to do so without just cause such a trade union is 
liable in terms of s 68 (1) (b) of the Act to compensate an employer who suffers losses due to 
an unprotected strike.257 
The notion of fairness in the context of awarding compensation in terms of 
section 68 (1) (b) of the LRA appears to have no clear parameters.  In the decision of Algoa 
Bus Company (Pty) Ltd v SATAWU258 the employer, a public transport company was faced 
with an unprotected strike.  As a result of the strike, commuters were without transport, which 
resulted in lost revenue for the employer.  The uncontested evidence reflected that the strike 
was premeditated, there were no attempts to comply with the LRA, the strike was not in the 
interest of orderly collective bargaining and neither was it in response to unjustified conduct 
of the employer.259  The employer claimed compensation for R465 001.34 that it quantified as 
losses caused by the unprotected strike.  
In arriving at its decision, the court had no hesitation in finding that the union 
and employees were liable for compensation in terms of the LRA.  The question of appropriate 
compensation was the issue in this case.  The judge alluded that his understanding of “just and 
equitable” compensation meant that it must be fair.260  In the circumstances, the judge ordered 
compensation for R100 000.00 to be paid in monthly instalments of R50.00 per month.   
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The courts are less tolerant of unprotected strikes, where employees and their 
trade unions are in wilful disregard to the requirements of chapter IV of the LRA.  In the case 
of Algoa Bus Company (Pty) Ltd v Transport Action Retail and General Workers Union261 
employees embarked on an unprotected strike that lasted 7 and a half working days.  The 
employer obtained an interdict against the workers on the 5th day of the strike, but this did little 
to dissuade workers.   
Ultimately, because the interdict was defied, the strike was premeditated and 
not in response to unjustified conduct of the employer, the court award compensation of R1 
406 285, 30 to be paid jointly and severally by the trade union and its members.  The Algoa 
judgment reflects a paradigm shift in terms of compensation awarded for losses incurred during 
unlawful strikes.  Compensation to this extent is unprecedented and sends a clear message to 
trade union organisers that employers do have recourse against non-compliance with chapter 
IV of the LRA.  Compensation is not an effective remedy against strike violence.  Despite the 
courts awarding compensation which is arguably mild compared to the level of losses 
experienced by employers and there is no evidence to suggest that compensation awarded in 
terms of section 68 (1) (b) has the effect of deterring striking employees from committing acts 
of violence and damage.  The LRA further does not define what “just and equitable” 
compensation means.262 
Since it is argued that compensation in terms of section 68 (1) (b) of the LRA 
may be inadequate, this brings into question whether there are other means of pursuing a claim 
against the trade union and striking employees for losses incurred during a violent strike such 
as the common law delictual claim for damages.   
According to Le Roux the main distinction between compensation awarded in 
terms of section 68 (1) (b) and the common law action for damages are as follows: 
The common law delictual claim requires that the plaintiff must establish that he/she or it 
suffered loss caused by the unlawful and intentional or negligent act or omission of another 
party.  If these requirements are met the plaintiff is entitled to recover the full loss suffered.  A 
claim for compensation will succeed if the requirements of s 68 (1) (b) are met and the Court 
has a wide discretion to determine what the amount of compensation would be.263  
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The main difference between a common law delictual claim and compensation 
in terms of section 68 (1) (b) of the LRA is that with the former once a claim has been proven 
the plaintiff will be awarded the damages that were incurred whereas with the latter, the 
discretion to award compensation lies with the court.  From the cases discussed above it is clear 
that this discretion could vary between minimal and substantial compensation and this has the 
tendency to lead to disproportionate outcomes.  It is argued that the remedy of compensation 
awarded by the Labour Court in terms of the LRA is the correct remedy.  Tenza notes that the 
“the Labour Court has a wide discretion to determine the amount of compensation to be 
awarded.”264 Furthermore “the Labour court should be willing to award more substantial 
amounts of compensation for these type of wrongdoings to discourage unions and their 
members from continuing with unlawful conduct in the future.”265 
3.8.3  Dismissal: 
In addition to obtaining an interdict and claiming compensation to remedy strike violence 
employers are permitted to dismiss striking employees.  Dismissal means that “an employer 
has terminated employment with or without notice.”266  An employer is permitted to dismiss 
striking employees who commit misconduct during a protected strike and for operational 
requirements.267  The act of participating in an unprotected strike can also warrant a 
dismissal.268   
Prior to the dismissal of striking employees, employers must consider the Code 
of Good Practice: Dismissal269 which provides that “a dismissal is unfair if it is not effected for 
a fair reason and in accordance with a fair procedure.”270  Item 6 of the Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal provides that participation in an unprotected strike “does not always deserve 
dismissal.”271  A decision to dismiss employees for participation in an unprotected strike must 
take into account “(a) the seriousness of the contravention, (b) attempts made to comply with 
this Act; and (c) whether or not the strike was in response to unjustified conduct by the 
employer.”272 
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It is argued that the dismissal of striking employees, whether for participation 
in an unprotected strike, or for misconduct during a protected strike is an extremely strong 
remedy because it severs the employment relationship.  Dismissal is an effective remedy 
because the employer will not have to deal with the striking employees after they have been 
dismissed.   
3.9 Picketing: 
The LRA recognises the expression of strikes in the form of picketing.273 Picketing is defined 
as,  
the placement of union members at the entrance to workplaces with various banners and 
placards, indicating their reason for being there.  The functioning of picketing is a means of 
securing support and maintenance of a strike by publicising the strike, persuading non-strikers 
who have to pass the picket line to join the strike, and to deter scabs from operating at the 
plant.274 
The employer and trade union can meet to establish picketing rules. Should the 
parties be unable to agree on picketing rules the commissioner must establish picketing rules.275 
Picketing rules set the parameters within which a strike can take place.  In addition, picketing 
rules can also provide for consequences if the rules are contravened by employees.   
According to section 69 of the LRA a picket may be held “(a) in any place to 
which the public has access but outside the premises of the employer; or (b) with the permission 
of the employer, inside the employers premises.”276  Section 69 (3) further stipulates that “the 
permission referred to in subsection (2) (b) may not be unreasonably withheld.”277 
In a situation where the employer does not own the premises where the 
workplace is based and where it is owned by a separate party the LRA provides that employees 
may picket “(a) in a place contemplated in section 69 (2) (a) which is owned or controlled by 
a person other than an employer if that person has had an opportunity to make representations 
to the Commission.”278 
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In Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v The Commission for Conciliation Mediation 
and Others279 the employer launched an urgent application to vary the picketing rules 
established by the CCMA commissioner.  The picketing rules established by the CCMA 
permitted the employees to picket within the employers’ premises.  Pillay J indicated that the 
court does have the power to review picketing rules established by the CCMA 
commissioner.280  In reviewing picketing rules, the Labour Court will establish whether the 
employer’s refusal to allow employees to picket inside the premises is objectively 
reasonable.281  With the facts before Pillay J, it was apparent that the CCMA commissioner 
established the picketing rules without first hearing the employer.282  The matter was remitted 
to the CCMA for a fresh meeting on picketing rules.  What we draw from the Shoprite Checkers 
decision is that the court will look at all the factors objectively and then decide whether it will 
grant employees the ability to picket within the employers premises.  Ordinarily it is not for 
the Labour Court to decide.  This power is vested in the CCMA commissioner to decide.   
The Code of Good Practice on Picketing283 promotes the “right to assemble, to 
demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions,”284 but qualifies this by stating that, “this 
constitutional right can only be exercised peacefully and unarmed.”285   
“Picketers may not physically prevent members of the public, including 
customers, other employees and service providers from gaining access to or leaving the 
employer’s premises.”286 Importantly, picketers cannot “commit any action which may be 
unlawful, including but not limited to any action which is, or may be perceived to be 
violent.”287 Therefore, the LRA adequately regulates the right to strike by providing 
comprehensive rules and guidelines to deal with picketing.   
The cases that come before the courts however depict a gross disrespect for 
picketing agreements.  In Tsogo Sun (Pty) Ltd t/a Montecasino v Future of South Africa 
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Workers Union 288 the employer and trade union concluded a picketing agreement in the 
context of a protected strike.289  The employees breached the picketing rules by:  
engaging in a variety of criminal acts, including assault, theft, malicious damage to property, 
and blocking access to and egress from the applicant's premises. The conduct described in the 
founding and supplementary affidavits includes the emptying of rubbish bins onto the road 
outside Montecasino, burning tyres on the road, blocking the road with 20 litre water bottles, 
throwing packets of broken glass onto the road, throwing bricks at members of the SAPS, 
damaging vehicles, dragging passengers from vehicles and assaulting them, rolling concrete 
dustbins into Montecasino Boulevard, damaging patron's vehicles, and assaulting persons in 
the vicinity of Montecasino.290   
During the violent protected strike, the employer referred a case to the CCMA 
concerning the breach of the picketing agreement.  The union did not dispute the acts of 
violence but instead indicated that the employer was “provoking them”.291  The court in this 
case confirmed an interim order made by the Labour Court and awarded costs against the trade 
union.   
 
3.10 Conclusion:   
This chapter analysed the Constitution and LRA in respect to strikes.  The Constitution regards 
the right to strike as an important tool to assist in collective bargaining.  The strike provisions 
of the Constitution were drafted considering the difference in power between employers and 
employees.  Therefore, the right to strike is entrenched as opposed to recourse to lockout.   
The right to strike and collective bargaining are complementary.  Collective 
bargaining precedes strikes.  This chapter identified the LRA as specific legislation that 
governs strikes.  It is argued that the LRA adequately regulates the right to strike by providing 
for simple and minimal pre-strike procedures.  Employees are then protected against dismissal 
and breach of contract as well as immunised from civil and delictual liability.   
This chapter highlights that the pre-strike procedures are designed to promote a 
culture of collective bargaining.  The courts indicate that the right to strike will not be unduly 
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CAUSES OF STRIKE VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 Introduction: 
Violence during strikes in South Africa is rife.  This chapter explores the causes of strike 
violence.  The issues experienced by employees are a significant factor that leads to violence 
during strikes.  This dissertation does not aim to provide a sociological account of the causes 
of strike violence.  The aim is to present and analyse the key social factors that impact on strike 
violence such as unemployment, poverty, inequality. In addition, the use of replacement labour 
and whether this increases strike violence will be investigated and lastly the impact of 
casualization and non-standard forms of employment have on strike violence will be analysed.  
4.2 Strike violence and “local moral orders”: 
The level of violent strikes in South Africa has risen exponentially in recent years.292  Von 
Holdt starts from the premise of analysing violent strikes before and after the 
“institutionalisation” of labour relations in South Africa.  The aim of doing so is to examine 
whether legislation is effective in meeting its objective of promoting labour peace.  Von Holdt 
explains that violence is an intrinsic element of the notion of a strike.  In short, employees feel 
that they do not obtain results if violence is not utilised during strikes.293 
Importance is given to the idea that violent strikes during the apartheid regime 
were based on a strong sense of community identity or what the author terms as “local moral 
orders.”294  This is a transient concept that may vary among communities, which means that, 
depending on the community, there is no single reason for violent strikes.   
This implies that the political situation that prevails provides a strong incentive 
for workers to exhibit a similar form of protest in the working environment.  According to Von 
Holdt, at present employees feel that promises made to them during the struggle for democracy 
have not materialised and this frustration gives rise to violent strikes.   
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Moreover, it can be said that employees resort to violence because of feeling 
marginalised, weak and disempowered due to non-standard forms of employment and 
casualisation.295  Von Holdt concludes that the prevalence of strike violence is not always a 
legal problem but rather a by-product of the broader social context.296 
This conclusion is plausible if applied to the historical incidents of violent 
strikes as described in chapter two, which occurred in the context of racism and social 
inequality.  Post-democracy, the social dynamics may have changed, however, the South 
African context is characterised by social inequality which may serve as a catalyst for violent 
strikes.    
 
4.3 Structural inequality and strike violence in the mining sector: 
Structural violence is a theory which looks at the structure of South African society as being 
the cause of strike violence.  Thembeka Ngcukaitobi297 argues that the extreme violence that 
is common in the South African workplace is a corollary of the structure of society.  Hence, as 
opposed to looking at the problem from the perspective of the actual employees who embark 
on violent strikes, he argues that one must look to the structures of South African society to 
elicit the reasons that cause violent strikes.   
The author examines strike violence against the backdrop of the mineworkers’ 
strike at Marikana in 2012.  Ngcukaitobi posits that the economic and political order of the day 
has a material impact on the violence that plays out during strikes, “The issues that occupied 
the workers of Marikana – of grinding poverty – are primarily political and economic, not 
labour questions.  They were transformed into labour questions because of what has been 
termed by social scientists, structural violence.”298  
‘Structural Violence’, at its bare minimum “refers to a form of violence where 
some social structure or social institution harms people by preventing them from meeting their 
basic needs.”299  A common view expressed during the Marikana strike was that employees 
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wanted a higher wage to ameliorate their hardships.  Workers candidly expressed their 
predicament resulting from dysfunctional service delivery. 300  
Ngcukaitobi argues that the social structures in place deprive individuals of 
obtaining their most basic social needs and this is a form of violence.  It is argued that this 
reasoning is plausible.  The violence demonstrated by the striking employees of Lonmin at 
Marikana must, therefore, be retaliation against the status quo as the author maintains that 
“there is a link between structural violence and direct violence.”301 The author concludes that 
“massive unemployment, soaring poverty levels and income inequality that characterise the 
South African labour market”302 provide an explanation for strike violence. 
To elaborate on his views of inequality, poverty and unemployment, 
Ngcukaitobi refers to the difference of earnings between employees in South Africa and uses 
an example of where a mine worker would take 257 years to make what a mining executive 
makes in one year.303  Ngcukaitobi also refers to the impact of HIV/AIDS on employees that 
leads to further social inequality and disadvantage.   
Inequality, unemployment and poverty are inextricably linked with the labour 
market.304  Since democracy in South Africa unemployment has increased.305  Unemployment 
is the key driver of inequality.306 Even lower paid employees are not exempt from poverty 
when matched against the wealth of employees that earn more.307  Currently in the first quarter 
of 2020 Statistics South Africa indicates that the rate of unemployment is calculated at 29,1 
per cent.308  It is argued that due to inequality, unemployment and poverty employees resort to 
strikes in order to alleviate their plight.   
According to Govender309 South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in 
the world.310  The gap between the wealthy and the poor are ever widening and this certainly 
affects the way in which employees deal with inequality.  Govender argues that inequality and 
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poverty lead to violence.311  As a result of the poverty and inequality that workers experience, 
violence is considered an appropriate tool to obtain their demands.    This view is supported by 
Murwirapachena and Sibanda who assert that inequality and poverty ‘fuels the fire’312 for 
greater expectations on the part of employees due to the “huge inequity in remuneration 
structures in South Africa.”313  Employees view their poverty and inequality as an aggravating 
factor that leads them to the forefront of strike action. 
According to Benjamin,314 the lack of social transformation in South Africa 
since democracy in 1994 has resulted in social and economic injustice and inequality315 
Benjamin argues that: “in this context the resort to violence, which was a dominant mode of 
struggle against apartheid retains significance both as a tactic to achieve demands and a form 
of protest action.”316  Benjamin’s view can therefore be interpreted to mean that since there has 
been inadequate social transformation since democracy in 1994 employees readily engage in 
violent conduct to address the inequality and injustice that they face.  According the Benjamin 
violence has been normalised as a tool against inequality.317  Therefore, Benjamin’s views are 
comparable Von Holdt who argues that social inequality has led to the normalisation of 
violence being used as a weapon to address social inequality.318 
Inequality, unemployment and poverty are significant social factors that gives 
rise to strikes.  The extent of inequality, unemployment and poverty persuade employees to 
pursue their demands violently.  Employees do not only see strikes as enhancing their own 
remuneration but also a means of bettering their social circumstances.  In the next section, this 
dissertation will examine the link between non-standard employment and casualization to strike 
violence.   
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4.4 Non-standard employment, casualization and the link to strike violence.   
4.4.1 Non-standard employment: 
Poverty, unemployment and inequality are not the only reasons for strike violence.  A 
significant contributing factor to strike violence can be attributed to the tensions that arise from 
‘non-standard’ employment.  Benjamin defines ‘non-standard’ employment as: “outsourcing, 
the use of fixed term contracts, temporary or part time work and labour broking.”319 A ‘non-
standard’ employment relationship can be distinguished from a standard employment 
relationship in which employment continues for an indeterminate or permanent period and 
which is normally regulated by a contract of employment.320  Furthermore employees work at 
a particular workplace which is under the control of an employer.321  The different types of 
‘non-standard’ employees will be discussed below.   
Outsourcing refers to the process of “replacing services of existing employees 
by engaging an outside contractor whose duties are perceived to be extraneous to the core 
business of the employer.”322 An example of outsourcing would be where an employer 
retrenches a cleaner and makes use of an external cleaning company instead. The effect of 
outsourcing is that the workplace becomes diluted with employees who may not work for the 
same employer thus making it difficult for employees and their unions organise collectively.   
Temporary, part time and fixed term contract employees all work for a limited 
period with an employer.323  When compared to the standard employment relationship 
discussed above, fixed term employees may work for one employer and at one workplace.  
Furthermore temporary, part time and fixed term employees may also work subject to a contract 
of employment.  The key distinction lies in the fact that temporary, part time and fixed term 
contract employees work for a limited duration only this has led to the process of Casualization.  
Casualization is a process that refers to “the make-up of the workforce that has changed or is 
changing as a consequence of the increased use of temporary or part time employees.”324  
Employees that work for a labour broker or interchangeably known as a 
temporary employment service (hereafter referred to as TES) are also regarded as “non-
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standard” employees.  A temporary employment service “means any person who, for reward, 
procures for or provides to a client other person – (a) who perform work for the client and (b) 
who are remunerated by the temporary employment service.”325 
4.4.2 Casualization  
Du Toit and Ronnie argue that the nature of the workplace has changed significantly due to 
casualization resulting in difficulties for trade unions to organise employees as they previously 
did.326  Prior to casualization trade unions organised employees as a collective which would 
make the process of embarking on a strike easy to comply with.  Changes brought to the 
workplace have resulted in difficulties organising employees due to casualization and non-
standard forms of employment.  The result is, according to Du Toit and Ronnie that large parts 
of the workforce are excluded from enjoying the right to strike.327 
Strike violence is worsened as employees find it difficult to collectively 
organise strikes due to casualization whereas non-standard employment workers are deprived 
of fully exercising their right to strike which further angers them and worsens their 
predicament. Du Toit and Ronnie postulate:  
In South Africa, it is suggested, extreme social inequality plays the biggest part in fuelling the 
tensions that are manifested in disorderly labour disputes.  Violence, furthermore, is not the 
only consequence of inadequate dispute resolution mechanisms; social (and racial) divisions 
may be deepened by the invisible exploitation of workers who have no effective channel of 
resolving their frustrations.328 
Casualization and non-standard types of employment have the effect of 
dislocating the employee from practices associated with collective action.329  “Many 
workplaces become home to a cluster of service providers each with its own workforce that did 
not employ them.”330  This environment according to Du Toit and Ronnie is “not conducive to 
collective bargaining.”331  
Due to the disjointed nature of the workplace caused by casualization and the 
use of temporary employment services it is difficult to organise employees to strike.  It is 
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argued that this has an effect of making non-standard employees feel marginalised and 
powerless.  It is submitted that employees in this context, use violence to gain power and 
effectively negotiate with the employer.   
When employees are not able to exercise their right to strike as a collective this 
leads to frustration and tension, it is argued that this is a significant contributing factor to strike 
violence.  A significant example of the effects of casualization and non-standard working 
arrangements were visible during the platinum sector strikes in 2012. 
During the strike at the Impala platinum mine in 2012 employees requested a 
two hundred percent wage increase.332  The employees were historically affiliated to the 
National Union of Mineworkers (hereafter referred to as NUM) but chose to by-pass the union 
and employer collective bargaining structures and voiced their demands through informally 
established worker forums.333  The platinum mining sector has the highest level of third party 
employment in South Africa.334  Casualization and the use of outsourced and temporary 
employment service employees clearly has an impact on how collective bargaining is 
undertaken.  The employees chose to abandon established collective bargaining structures and 
deal with management directly which resulted in widespread violence.     
Chinguno asserts that the “proliferation in the externalisation of work designed 
to minimise risk and maximise profits”335 has become the dominant form of employment in 
the platinum sector.  Externalisation can be defined as:  
Externalization […] gives rise to a triangular (or trilateral) form of employment in which a 
client or core business (what the International Labour Organization (ILO) described as a 'user 
enterprise' in its failed attempt to introduce a convention on contract labour) implicitly or 
explicitly determines the conditions under which the employees of the contractor or service 
provider it engages work.336 
As a result of externalisation, employees have chosen to abandon historic collective bargaining 
structures and deal directly with employers because it is too difficult to collectively organise.  
This has resulted in violent consequences during strikes.   
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The mismatch between wage demands and what is offered by the employer can 
also be argued as a factor that causes strike violence.  The wage demand in the Impala Platinum 
strike discussed above was based on an increase of two hundred percent.  Similarly, during the 
Lonmin strike at Marikana employees demanded a basic wage of R12500.00 which was far 
from what the employer offered.337  The frustration that emerges as a result of the disparity of 
what is demanded as opposed to what is offered is often a factor that escalates into conflict.338 
 
4.5 The utilisation of replacement employees and strike violence  
During the course of a strike, whether protected or not, the employer may impose a lock-out 
and engage replacement employees to replace the striking employees.339 The purpose of 
employing replacement employees is to continue with production whilst the strike continues.340 
The use of replacement labour during strikes has been identified as a factor that contributes to 
strike violence.341  Tenza posits that the appointment of replacement labour during a strike “has 
turned out to be the root cause of violent strikes.”342  The key reasons for the link between the 
engagement of replacement employees and strike violence is that the striking employees feel 
that they cannot inflict economic harm against the employer when the business is allowed to 
continue production or render services whilst the employees are without remuneration.   
Section 76 (1) of the LRA provides that an “employer may not take into 
employment any person- (b) for the purpose of performing work of any employee who is locked 
out, unless the lock-out is in response to a strike.”  Therefore, if an employer effects a lock-out 
in compliance with section 64 (1) of the LRA to compel employees to oblige to a demand in 
respect of any matter of mutual interest, that employer cannot appoint replacement employees 
during the lock-out unless the lock-out is in response to a strike.   Thus, if employees embark 
on a strike, regardless of whether that strike complies with section 64 (1) of the LRA, the 
                                                          
337 Marikana: How the wage war was won – The Mail and Guardian https://mg.co.za/article/2012-09-21-00-
marikana-how-the-wage-war-was-won/ accessed on the 21 March 2020. 
338 Murwirapachena & Sibanda (note 10;554)  
339 T Kujinga and S van Eck “The right to strike and replacement labour: South African practice viewed from an 
international law perspective.” (2018) 21 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1;2.   
340 Ibid.  
341 M Tenza “The link between replacement labour and eruption of violence during industrial action.” (2016) 37 
(1) Obiter 106-120. 
342 M Tenza “An investigation into the causes of violent strikes in South Africa: some lessons from foreign law 
and possible solutions.” (2015) 19 Law, Democracy and Development  211; 219. 
62 
 
employer is permitted to appoint replacement employees to do the work of employees who are 
on strike.343 
When employees withdraw their labour, they envisage that the employer’s 
production or services that an employer renders will come to a halt, this deprives employers of 
profit which is the purpose of being in business.  In this regard a strike places economic 
pressure344 on the employer to accept the employees demands or to satisfy a grievance.  When 
the employer is permitted to appoint replacement employees to do the work of those employees 
who are on strike, this affects the economic pressure that the striking employees wish to inflict 
on the employer.345  
Tenza posits that the use of replacement labour causes friction and “strikers 
believe that the use of such workers robs them of their weaponry of strike.”346  Tenza further 
notes that the use of replacement labour triggers violence as workers become frustrated that 
replacement employees are doing work whilst they are on strike.347  The appointment of 
replacement employees during a strike can be indicative of bad faith bargaining on the part of 
the employer.348  It is submitted that employees believe that, when they embark on a strike they 
will not be remunerated, and in exchange the business of the employer will cease to operate 
thus causing losses in profit.  When the employer engages replacement employees under these 
circumstances striking employees get the impression that the employer does not care about 
negotiating in good faith but only cares about enrichment this aggravates employees and results 
in them venting their frustration through violent conduct.  It is argued that employees feel 
betrayed when replacement employees are brought in and it is business as normal.    
Historically, replacement employees have always faced the brunt of angry 
strikers.  In National Union of Metalworkers South Africa v GM Vincent Metal sections (Pty) 
Ltd349 the employees embarked on a strike which was a nationwide stay away organised by 
their trade union NUMSA.  During the protracted nationwide strike, the employer made 
numerous attempts to call the employees back to work, to which calls the striking employees 
ignored.  The employer eventually issued ultimatums for the employees to resume work, but 
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this was ignored.  The employees were dismissed for failing to report for duty, after which, 
they referred an unfair labour practice dispute to the Industrial Court under the LRA of 1956 
as the dismissals took place before the promulgation of the LRA.   
Evidence presented to the court indicated that the replacement employees were 
the target of the striking employees as they were prevented from entering the premises of the 
employer, they were threatened with violence, they were identified and removed from the 
premises.  
The legal question in this case was whether the employer committed an unfair 
labour practice (under the LRA 1956) by dismissing the striking employees who refused to 
comply with ultimatums to return to work.  In the end, the court found that the employer did 
not commit an unfair labour practice by dismissing the employees for not adhering to the 
ultimatums  However, this judgment is important as it demonstrates that replacement 
employees are often the target of striking employees.   
In SA Transport and Allied Workers Union v Ram Transport (Pty) Ltd350 the 
Labour Court was required to determine if the  employees were dismissed fairly.  The 
allegations against the employees involved acts of violence that were committed during an 
unprotected strike.  The allegations consisted of threatening and intimidating replacement 
employees who were brought in to work whilst the employees were on an unprotected strike.351  
The main reasons for the  dismissals were that they prevented replacement employees from 
coming to work; and for intimidating and harassing the replacement employees.  The evidence 
accepted by the court showed the employees making “cutthroat” gestures towards replacement 
employees.352  The employees  went as far as to intercept private vehicles that replacement 
employees were travelling in and threatened them against coming to work or  they would be 
beaten up.353 
The employees were found guilty of intimidation and threatening conduct based 
on the evidence of witnesses and video footage that was presented to the court. 354  The court 
however could not uphold the employers decision to dismiss the employees because the 
employer was inconsistent in the application of discipline which made the  dismissals 
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substantively unfair.355  The employer was found to have acted inconsistently because only one 
employee was given a final written warning when he was implicated in most of the misconduct 
and the employer could not put forward a proper explanation to justify this inconsistency.356  
The court instead reinstated some employees with limited backpay whilst others were 
reinstated subject to final warnings.357 
Robertson Winery (Pty) Ltd v Commercial Stevedoring Agricultural & Allied 
Workers Union and Others358 concerned employees who were on a protected strike over issues 
relating to wages.  The strike had been protracted which resulted in the employer approaching 
the Labour Court for an interdict to restrain striking employees from engaging in unlawful 
conduct which included preventing replacement employees from going to work during the 
strike.359  The interdict was granted however this did not dissuade striking employees from 
committing unlawful acts.  The employer aggrieved by the striking employees breach of the 
interdict, approached the Labour Court again to hold the union officials and striking employees 
in contempt of the interdict. 
Upon considering the facts the court was of the view that even though acts of 
intimidation and threats were made against replacement employees the employer could not 
identify the individual perpetrators thus absolving the employees of being in contempt of court.  
The union however was found to be in contempt of court for not ensuring that replacement 
employees were not threatened or intimidated.360  The union was also held to be in contempt 
of the court order for threats made against the Human Resources manager of the company.  The 
court imposed a fine of R50 000.00 suspended over a twelve-month period on condition that 
the trade union was not found guilty of contempt of court.361 
From the cases surveyed above it is clear that there is a link between the use of 
replacement employees and strike violence.  Striking employees do not want replacement 
employees to work whilst there is a strike taking place.  The motivation behind intimidating 
and threatening replacement employees, it is suggested, is to make the employer feel the 
economic harm of a strike.  Whilst the employer is allowed to continue production or render 
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services whilst the striking employees are without remuneration results in anger experienced 
by striking employees.  Striking employees do feel that their efforts to withdraw their labour 
are undermined when the employer can continue with its operations using replacement 
employees who become the target of the striking employees.    
Tenza is of the view that “the provision that sanctions replacement labour 
should be removed.”362 Not only will this result in employers not being able to appoint 
replacement employees during a strike, it will also mean that employers will be prohibited from 
continuing with production during a strike which will most certainly result in financial ruin and 
major employment losses.  It is argued that allowing an employer to employ replacement 
employees during a strike is part of the power play that accompanies a strike and is therefore 
necessary.  Anstey points out that “the employer is entitled to use replacement workers and 
may resort to the lockout option to put pressure on a union to accept its proposals.”363 
Calling for a complete removal of the provision that sanctions the use of 
replacement labour fails to consider the impact that will be felt by businesses if production is 
stopped completely.  Jordaan is of the view that:   
While the use of replacement labour does not deprive workers of the right to strike, a total ban 
on the use of replacement labour will mean that the employer is denied the right to do business.  
It is submitted that a substantial case would have to be made out on the basis of public policy 
as to why this should be the case.  The mere fact that replacement labour may reduce the 
effectiveness of a strike is simply not enough.364 
Replacement employees that are appointed during a strike is a contentious issue 
that contributes to strike violence.  The legality of replacement employees in response to a 
strike is permitted in terms of section 76 (1) of the LRA.  The mere fact that replacement labour 
angers striking workers is not cause for the abolition of section 76 (1) as the viability and 
sustainability of businesses also need to be considered.  Chapter 5 will discuss solutions to deal 
with strike violence.   
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The aim of this chapter is to highlight the causes of strike violence.  Considering the literature 
presented, strike violence cannot only be attributed to shortcomings in the law.  Social, political 
and economic factors also have an influence on the violent nature of a strike.  In addition, this 
chapter has identified factors such as casualization, non-standard employment and the 
mismatch between wage demands and offers can contribute to violent strikes. The use of 
replacement employees is another factor that contributes to strike violence as employees may 
perceive the use of replacement employees by the employer as acting in bad faith because 
employees are deprived of remuneration whilst the employer maintains production.  
Von Holdt argues that “local moral orders” in response to the institutionalisation 
of labour laws will determine whether or not strikes will be violent.  The subjects of Von 
Holdt’s study indicate that violence is a normative response to disempowerment and 
disillusionment with the powers that be.  This, according to Von Holdt provides an explanation 
for violent strikes.  
Ngcukaitobi’s views are plausible, by arguing that the inequality of South 
African society and the lack of resources contribute to employees’ frustration, which leads to 
strike violence.  Ngcukaitobi promotes a view that in order to rectify structural inequality, the 
structures and institutions of South Africa need to be addressed to achieve non-violence in the 










PREVENTION OF STRIKE VIOLENCE 
 
5.1 Introduction: 
Any solution to strike violence raises two integral considerations.  The first being how the law 
responds to strike violence and the second being, how the employer, employees and their 
representatives can prevent such violence.  The employer has various options available to stop 
strike violence, these include: approaching the Labour Court for an interdict to restrain striking 
workers from committing violence which has been discussed extensively in chapter 3;  
applying to have a strike declared unlawful by the Labour Court; the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act365 (hereafter referred to as the LRAA) provides for a compulsory secret ballot 
before a strike takes place;  in addition the LRAA makes provision for an “advisory arbitration 
panel in the public interest” to avoid strike violence. These new amendments will also be 
discussed to ascertain the effectiveness in curbing strike violence.  From the perspective of 
avoiding strike violence, this chapter will also focus on negotiation practices that can prevent 
strike violence.   
5.2 Declaring a protected strike unprotected: 
Recent jurisprudence indicates that a strike may lose its protection due to the violent conduct 
of employees.  Where protection is lost, workers become susceptible to dismissal, breach of 
contract and delict arising from their conduct.366 
In Tsogo Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd trading as Montecasino v Future of South 
African Workers Union & others,367  the court remarked that, 
This court will always intervene to protect both the right to strike and the right to peaceful 
picketing.  This is an integral part of the court’s mandate, conferred by the Constitution and the 
LRA.  But the exercise of the right to strike is sullied and ultimately eclipsed when those who 
purport to exercise it engage in acts of gratuitous violence to achieve their ends.  When the 
tyranny of the mob displaces the peaceful exercise of economic pressure as the means to the 
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end of the resolution of a labour dispute, one must question whether a strike continues to serve 
its purpose and whether it continues to enjoy protected status368 (emphasis supplied). 
A strike may become unprotected due to the conduct of striking workers.369  The 
court in NUFBWSAW v Universal Product Network (Pty) Ltd370 (hereafter referred to as the 
NUFBWSAW decision) affirmed in principle, that a lawful strike may lose its protected status 
due to the level and degree of violent action by workers.   
The employees embarked on a protected strike with the assistance of their trade 
union.  It was common cause before the Labour Court that the EFF, a political party, supported 
the striking workers. During the strike, banners criticising the employer for doing business with 
Israel were displayed.  The employer challenged the validity of the strike notice by arguing that 
the strike became politically motivated and did not support the initial demand of workers 
relating to conditions of service.  The employer applied for an interdict to declare the strike 
unprotected due to the alleged levels of violence that took place during the strike. The court 
adopted the test posited by Rycroft, which asks the question, “Has misconduct taken place to 
an extent that the strike no longer promotes functional collective-bargaining and is therefore 
no longer deserving of its protected status?”371  The court did not elaborate on this test but 
adopted it as a principle to declare a protected strike unprotected.   
Although the court adopted this test to determine if a protected strike should 
lose its protected status, the court emphasised the potential effect of doing so.  The court 
highlighted that even though a strike can be declared unprotected due to the levels and degrees 
of violence, this conclusion must not be lightly reached.372  The court further explained that, 
 While, as it has previously indicated, this court will in appropriate circumstances declare an 
initially protected strike unprotected on account of levels and degrees of violence which 
seriously undermine the fundamental values of our Constitution, this is not a conclusion that 
ought lightly to be reached. A conclusion to this effect itself denies the exercise of fundamental 
labour rights, and as the Constitutional Court pointed out in SATAWU, this court ought not to 
easily adopt too intrusive an interpretation of the substantive limits on the exercise of the right 
to strike.373 
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From the evidence presented the court was not persuaded that the level and 
degree of violence were sufficient to declare the strike unprotected.  The court did not decide 
what threshold of violence would be sufficient to declare a protected strike unprotected.  
Therefore, the facts of a case will determine when a strike will be declared unprotected.   
The application before the court in the NUFBSWAW decision was to make an 
interim order interdicting the striking workers, final.  The court maintained that such 
applications are to be determined cautiously.  The reason for doing so is to ensure that the 
courts do not become involved in collective bargaining between employers and their 
employees. 
The ability to apply for a strike to be declared unprotected is a viable option to 
the employer, especially in the case where violence has replaced peaceful protest.  A court, 
having to decide this question will have to ask, “Has misconduct taken place to an extent that 
the strike no longer promotes functional collective-bargaining, and is therefore no longer 
deserving of its protected status?”374  
5.3 Compulsory secret ballot before a strike: 
The LRAA makes provision for a secret ballot to be undertaken before trade unions can 
organise its members to embark on a strike.   
Section 19 of LRAA, entitled “transitional provisions” provides that trade 
unions and employers organisations must make provision for a “secret and recorded” ballot 
requirement in their constitutions before embarking on a strike or lock-out respectively.375  
Until such time as trade unions and employers’ organisations effect these changes to their 
constitutions they must undertake a secret ballot before embarking on a strike or lock-out.376  
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If a trade union does not comply with a secret ballot before engaging in a strike 
the employer may challenge the trade union for not complying with section 19 of the LRAA 
which will prevent employees from going on strike until a secret ballot is complied with.377 
The requirement of a secret ballot before engaging in a strike has great potential 
to curb the possibility of violence.  A secret ballot requires that all members of a trade union 
must, in confidence and privacy indicate whether they agree or refuse to go on a strike.  If the 
majority of union members elect to go on strike, then this reflects the democratic will of the 
members to go on strike.  If the majority of members elect not to go on strike, then the strike 
does not enjoy the support of the members.  Tenza is of the view that if a strike enjoys little 
support there is less likelihood of violence occurring.378 
Violence will also be prevented based on the secrecy of the ballot as this 
preserves the integrity of the member who votes for, or against strike action.  Tenza posits that 
the confidentiality of a secret ballot will prevent victimisation and ensure transparency in the 
strike process.379  Therefore the secret ballot requirement is a significant step to reduce the 
level of violence prevalent in South African strikes.  The main aim behind the introduction of 
the compulsory secret ballot is to guard against “violent behaviour during strikes, intimidation 
of other workers and damage to property during marches and industrial action.”380  Fergus and 
Jacobs comment that the aim behind introducing the compulsory secret ballot requirement are 
“worthy goals”381 furthermore, “Strike violence is highly problematic and intimidation of 
union members (and other employees) who do not wish to strike is often a significant part of 
that. Supporting well governed and democratic unions is equally important.”382 The 
compulsory strike ballot requirement will assist in reducing violent strikes.  Rycroft also 
endorses the strike ballot as “a democratic way of testing whether a majority of trade union 
members are in favour of a strike.”383  According to Rycroft: “ballots can offer legitimacy, 
transparency and inclusivity”384 to the decision to go on strike.  Since the requirement of the 
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compulsory secret ballot is a relatively new implementation time will determine whether it is 
in fact an adequate measure to reduce violent strikes.   
5.4 Advisory arbitration panel in the public interest.  
The LRAA makes a concerted effort to reduce violent strikes.  This is evidenced by the 
insertion of sections 150A to 150D.  These sections have been inserted to allow the Director of 
the CCMA to appoint an advisory arbitration panel in the public interest.  This dissertation will 
discuss the advisory arbitration panel in the public interest arguing that it is a welcome solution 
to the problem of strike violence and may help if the parties seriously consider the advice of 
the CCMA.  This dissertation will only focus on advisory arbitrations in so far as it relates to 
violent strikes and not recourse to lock-out which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.   
Section 150A (2) pertains to the “appointment of an advisory arbitration panel 
in the public interest” (hereafter referred to as “the panel”) specifically directed towards 
resolving strikes.  The panel must be appointed, if directed by the Minister of Labour385 or on 
application by a party to the dispute.386  In addition the Labour Court may order the 
appointment of the panel387 or the parties to the dispute may agree to the appointment of the 
panel.388 
The director may only appoint the panel “if the director has reasonable grounds 
to believe”:  
 
(a) The strike or lockout is no longer functional to collective bargaining in that it has 
continued for a protracted period of time and no resolution of the dispute appears 
to be imminent.  
(b) There is an imminent threat that constitutional rights may be or are being violated 
by persons participating in or supporting the strike or lockout through the threat or 
use of violence or the threat of or damage to property; or  
(c) The strike or lockout causes or has the imminent potential to cause or exacerbate 
an acute national or local crisis affecting the conditions for normal social and 
economic functioning of the community or society.389 
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Appointing the panel in the above-mentioned instances is evident of the 
legislature’s aim to resolve disputes in the context of strikes and to avoid violent conduct which 
typically accompanies protracted strikes.390 
Once the panel has been appointed to render an advisory arbitration award, “a 
person may not apply to any court of law to stay or review the establishment or proceedings of 
an advisory arbitration panel until the panel has issued its award.”391   This ensures that the 
work of the panel is not interrupted by frivolous legal applications which may delay the 
resolution of a dispute.  In addition, “the appointment of the panel does not interrupt or suspend 
right to strike or recourse to lockout in accordance with Chapter IV.”392  Thus neither the 
employer nor the trade union may not institute legal proceedings to suspend the strike or 
lockout once the panel has been appointed.  Either party who may seek to do so cannot interfere 
with the power play that is a characteristic of a strike or lock-out.   
Furthermore, “the panel must conduct its proceedings and issue an award within 
seven days of the arbitration hearing.”393 This implies that the CCMA must issue an award 
swiftly and expeditiously, as any delays may result in violent conduct from striking employees.  
An arbitration award rendered by the panel must include “a report on factual findings”394, 
“recommendations for the resolution of the dispute”395 and must provide a “motivation for why 
the recommendations ought to be accepted by the parties.”396  Importantly, the arbitration 
award must specify “the seven-day period within which the parties to the dispute must either 
indicate acceptance or rejection of the award.”397 
“If a party to the dispute fails to indicate either its acceptance or rejection of the 
award within the period contemplated in subsection (1) (d), the party is deemed to have 
accepted the award.”398  However if a party to the dispute rejects the award then it must provide 
a motivation to the panel as to why the award was rejected.399  The LRAA also provides that if 
a party to the dispute rejects the award, the members of their organisation must be consulted 
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before rejecting the award.400  It is submitted that requiring a trade union to consult with their 
members before rejecting an award is crucial.  The decision to go on strike is a significant one.  
Not only are employees without remuneration during the strike, there is the potential that the 
strike may escalate to violence.  Transparency at every stage of the strike process is therefore 
crucial.  The LRAA thus ensures that members of a union are in a learned position before the 
decision to strike is taken or to cease any violent conduct during the strike.   
The most important aspect of legislation is its enforceability.  In the case of 
advisory arbitration in the public interest the award issued by the panel is only binding if the 
parties to the dispute accepts such advice.401 If the advice is accepted then the award rendered 
by the panel is equivalent to a collective agreement concluded in terms of section 23 of the 
LRA.  If the parties fall within the jurisdiction of a bargaining council then the advisory 
arbitration award will also be equivalent to a collective agreement that can be extended to non-
parties in terms of section 32 of the LRA.  An advisory arbitration award is advice given by 
the CCMA to resolve a dispute.  If a party chooses not to accept such advice there are no 
repercussions.  
If one has regard to the way interdicts, which are legally binding, are blatantly 
disregarded it is doubtful that trade unions will heed the advice given by the CCMA.  
Nevertheless, the new insertions to advisory arbitration in the public interest are welcome as a 
measure for the CCMA to arbitrate and render its decision concerning a strike.  It would be 
difficult for a trade union to convince its members to undertake a strike that goes against an 
advisory arbitration award.   
5.5 A different approach to negotiations: 
The process that precedes a strike is important, the issue in dispute must be negotiated in a 
manner that will resolve the issues between the employer and employees.  It must be 
emphasised that employees should only strike as a last resort where negotiations fail.   
Before discussing the different methods of negotiation, it is important to identify 
the key characteristics of negotiations. Anstey describes negotiations as  
a verbal interactive process, involving two or more parties, who are seeking to reach an 
agreement, over a problem or conflict of interest between them and in which they seek, as far 
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as possible to preserve their interests, but adjust their views and positions in a joint effort to 
achieve an agreement.402 
Two types of negotiation namely positional negotiation and integrative 
negotiation will be discussed.   
5.5.1 Positional (distributive) negotiations:  
The positional method “involves negotiations in which one side’s gain is the 
other side’s loss.  It is win-lose bargaining.”403 The “distributive form of bargaining with its 
associated power plays is still the most prevalent form of negotiation in South Africa.”404   
Power is an important factor in positional negotiations; the employer derives 
power from the resources that it holds.  Employees, on the other hand, derive power from the 
threat of refusing to tender their services to satisfy their demands.  Therefore, during positional 
negotiations, parties will do their best to assert their power.  If the parties occupy themselves 
with the fight for power, conflict is inevitable.   
In positional negotiations, parties become defensive of their stake in the process.  
Demonstrating power is crucial to winning or losing at negotiations.  The fight for power is not 
the correct way of achieving gains during negotiations, as Bendix suggests, 
Although power is necessary within the context of successful negotiation, power (or even the 
perception of power) could prove extremely dangerous.  Negotiations are not a power game in 
which the intention of one party is to crush the other completely.  The objective is to reach a 
workable solution – workable in the sense that it is acceptable to both or all the parties 
involved.405 
It is clear, that the need for power is a characteristic of positional negotiations.  
In a context such as South Africa where resources are the subject matter of conflict, positional 
negotiations may be the incorrect approach between employers and employees.  Positional 
negotiation leads to conflict which may, in turn, lead to violence during strikes.   
Bendix theorises that environmental factors affect the way in which negotiations 
are conducted, arguing that the “economy, ideological preferences, socio-political 
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developments, public policy and demographic changes help to determine the content and 
progress of negotiations, the power balance between the parties and the attitude adopted by one 
party towards the other.”406  With these environmental factors in mind, it is conceivable that 
power and conflict may give rise to violent industrial action.  This may be the case in a situation 
where there are contests for resources and benefits.   
5.5.2 Integrative negotiations:    
The integrative method of negotiation is described as a “win-win” process.  The employer and 
the employee avoid taking up fixed positions during the negotiations.  The process has been 
defined as a “search for solutions which is creative and results in an agreement which meets 
both parties’ needs.”407 
This approach has also been described as one where “issues and processes are 
those in which a solution provides gain for labour and management, leading to joint gain.”408 
Therefore, if both employer and employee are to gain from this process of negotiation it will 
enrich their collective bargaining relationship.   
According to Bendix, the success of integrative negotiations depends on the 
mutual legitimacy, respect, openness and honesty between the employer and employee.  It is 
the willingness to share information and work towards a solution.409  Thus, it is clear that the 
success of integrative negotiations depends on the good bond between the employer and 
employees.  Integrative negotiation aims to enrich the collective bargaining relationship by 
benefitting both the employer and the employee.   
Therefore, it is appropriate for parties to engage in negotiations that build trust 
and mutual respect for each other. An approach that places the employer and employee in a 
contest for resources is not appropriate and may lead to violence.  The way negotiations are 
undertaken requires further education and training for them to be a success.   
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5.6 The role of the South African Police Service in dealing with strike 
violence and recommendations made by the Marikana Commission 
of Inquiry: 
The role of the SAPS is crucial in dealing with strike violence.  In terms of the Constitution, 
“the objects of the SAPS are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, 
to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property and to uphold and 
enforce the law.”410 There is a clear obligation on the SAPS to take preventative measures to 
avoid violence and maintain the peace.  This obligation on the part of the SAPS also applies to 
any industrial action that may lead to violence.   
The “Code of Good Practice: Picketing” provides guidance of the role of the 
SAPS during a picket.  The police are not permitted to intervene in the reasons behind a strike 
of a strike.  The SAPS must enforce the criminal law and arrest picketers who are armed and 
commit violence.  Importantly the police must protect the members of the public against the 
unlawful conduct of picketers.411 
The Marikana Commission of Inquiry scrutinised the role of the SAPS in 
dealing with strike violence.  The report concluded that the Public Order Policing Unit tasked 
with policing the gathering at Marikana was inadequate.412  The commission found that the 
police never “field tested” the crowd control tactics used at Marikana beforehand.413  The 
commission recommended the appointment of a panel of experts to conduct an analysis of the 
efficacy of the Public Order Policing Unit to execute their duties with a minimal risk of loss to 
human life or injury.414  While the Marikana Commission of Inquiry made recommendations 
about policing, the commission also noted that employees in South Africa have a propensity to 
carry dangerous weapons.415 The Marikana Commission further recommended more training 
needed to be carried out to handle workers who carry sharp weapons.416 
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Considering the prevalence of strike violence, it is apparent that the police serve 
an important role in preventing violence.  It is therefore vital that the SAPS be equipped to deal 
with violence using less harmful means.  The way the SAPS exercise their duties would 
certainly affect whether a strike is violent or not.   
5.7 Conclusion: 
Applying for an interdict is a viable option to deal with strike violence.  The courts are 
becoming stricter in holding employees and trade unions accountable for not complying with 
interdicts.  Interdicts are not respected by trade unions and their members regardless of fines 
and convictions imposed for contempt of court proceedings which diminishes its viability as a 
remedy to curb strike violence.     
An innovation in our law is the ability to declare a protected strike unlawful 
thereby exposing employees to dismissal, criminal and civil liability for their actions during a 
strike.  Although this may be a useful measure to curtail violent strikes, the test used to 
determine where a strike will lose its protected status has not been delineated by the courts.  
The degree of violence that would satisfy a court to declare a protected strike unprotected has 
not been established in principle.  Limiting strikes is an encroachment of a fundamental right.  
There is also the possibility that employers may use this avenue as an impediment to gain an 
advantage in the power play occasioned by strikes.  
The new amendments to the LRAA, requiring a compulsory secret ballot before 
employees can engage in strikes is a welcome addition to South African labour legislation that 
will curb violent strikes.  The compulsory secret ballot requirement will be a true yardstick to 
ascertain if union members want to go on strike.  Unions that do not comply with the ballot 
requirement are susceptible to challenge for not complying with section 19 of the LRAA.  
The LRAA also provides for the appointment of an advisory arbitration panel 
in the public interest.  The panel will be required to issue an award making recommendations 
to a trade union before or during a strike.  An advisory arbitration award in the public interest 
is not binding unless the parties to the dispute accepts it.  This it is argued impacts on the 
efficacy of advisory arbitration awards if unions do not heed the advice of the CCMA.  The 
insertion of sections 150A – 150D of the LRAA are welcome attempts to reduce strike violence.   
This chapter also provides insight into the different methods that can be used to 
negotiate.  The positional method of negotiation (or the “win-lose” approach) is most common 
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in South Africa.  This is not a suitable negotiation method as it involves the contest for power 
and resources which may lead to violence.  The distributive method of negotiation is preferred.  
Employers and employees are not adversaries in this method, rather both parties seek to find 
solutions to the matter of mutual interest that concerns them.  This approach is also known as 
“win-win” negotiation and is considered to build trust and mutual confidence between 
employees and employers.    
The SAPS have a constitutional and statutory duty to maintain and uphold the 
law.  The Public Order Policing Unit came under scrutiny for their handling of the strike 
violence at Marikana.  The Marikana commission of enquiry recommended that SAPS training 
needs to improve and that officers need to be better equipped to deal with workers in South 
Africa who have a propensity for carrying dangerous weapons.  There is no doubt, that the 
police have a crucial role to play in preventing strike violence.  Effective policing would avert 
























The Constitution and the LRA have been identified as vital legislation that regulates the right 
to strike.  The Constitution entrenches the right to strike.  The Constitution also entrenches the 
right to collective bargaining which is complementary to the right to strike.  It is argued that 
the right to strike is a weapon available to employees to urge employers to agree to demands 
or grievances.  Employers similarly have the weapon of lock-out to compel employees to accept 
an employer’s demands.  Jurisprudence indicates that the right to strike will be broadly 
interpreted as opposed to an interpretation that restricts the right.  Therefore, the law adequately 
regulates the right to strike.   
The LRA provides a vigorous regulatory framework by providing procedural 
preconditions and substantive requirements that must be complied with for strikes to be 
protected.  Once protected, employees are safeguarded against unfair dismissal, civil and 
criminal liability and breach of contract for the act of participating in a strike.  If, however 
employees commit a misconduct during a strike they can be disciplined, also if employees 
engage in criminal activities during a strike the criminal process will follow regardless of 
whether a strike is protected or not417.  It is argued that the procedural requirements were 
drafted in a simple manner and will be interpreted to promote rather than restrict the right to 
strike.    Thus, the LRA adequately regulates the right to strike by providing for worker 
protection and aiming to ensure peaceful strikes.   
The LRA also adequately regulates the right to strike by providing recourse to 
the employer if the stipulated procedures are not complied with.  Whether a strike is protected 
or not, employees lose immunity and may face dismissal for misconduct as well as be held 
liable for damages that may arise.  The employer may also claim compensation as a means of 
redress when employees participate in an unprotected strike.    
This dissertation argues that strike violence is not only because of shortcomings 
in the law but also because there are significant social, economic and political circumstances 
of South African society that encourage strike violence.  These factors are recapitulated below.   
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Von Holdt is of the view that employees engage in violent strikes as they believe 
violence to be an intrinsic element of participating in a strike.  Von Holdt draws this conclusion 
after examining incidences of strike violence pre- and post ‘institutionalisation’ in South 
Africa, arguing that much of the violence is due to the local moral orders of a community.  
Ngcukaitobi believes that the structure of South African society is one that 
commits violence against its citizens.  The author feels that because citizens are deprived of 
their basic needs this results in retaliation against the current order.  
Ngcukaitobi exemplifies this by using the demands of workers during the 
Marikana mineworkers strike to support his theory.  Ngcukaitobi’s views are that due to the 
unequal distribution of benefits and poverty in society, employees become violent to further 
their demands.    
This dissertation has also discussed how casualization and non-standard forms 
of employment can contribute to strike violence.  In addition, this dissertation also discussed 
what impact poverty, inequality and unemployment have in fuelling the fire of strike violence.    
This dissertation argues that strike violence can be prevented. Firstly, the 
employer can seek remedy from the courts by applying for an interdict to restrain striking 
workers from causing damage and violence.  If an interdict is not complied with, employees 
may be held in contempt of court.  This dissertation has demonstrated that interdicts are not 
always a viable option as case law is littered with instances where interdicts were blatantly 
ignored and undermined by trade unions and employees.  Further developments have occurred 
in South African law relating to the introduction of a compulsory secret ballot which has the 
potential of preventing violent strikes by utilising democratic balloting processes in order to 
gauge whether employees want to go on strike or not.  Advisory arbitration in the public interest 
is also a new intervention by the legislature to avoid protracted strikes that lead to violence.  
The CCMA will now play an interventionist role by adjudicating disputes of interest with a 
view of resolving strikes.  The efficacy of an advisory arbitration award in the public interest 
is however limited to whether the parties choose to abide by the award of the CCMA.       
Secondly, employers can apply to the Labour Court to have a protected strike 
declared unprotected.  Once an order of this nature is made, an employer may pursue civil and 
criminal remedies against the transgressors.  Declaring a strike unprotected is a developing area 
in our law.  Presently, the test is whether misconduct has taken place to an extent that the strike 
no longer promotes functional collective bargaining.  Implicit in this test is the extent or level 
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of violence exhibited to warrant the strike being declared unprotected.  It is logical, therefore, 
that the amount of violence necessary to declare a strike unprotected will depend on the facts 
of a case.   
By highlighting different approaches to negotiation, it is argued that the relevant 
role players can reduce the risk of violent strikes.  This paper highlighted the positional and 
integrative methods of negotiating, showing how an approach that will build a relationship of 
mutual trust, respect and understanding is more beneficial than an approach that will place the 
parties in an adversarial stance which leads to conflict rather than progress.  Thus, it is argued 
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